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Why Sit En Banc?
Stephen L. Wasby*
U.S. courts of appeals seldom provide reasons for granting or denying rehearing en
banc. The most likely reason for rehearing en banc is that other judges believe the
three-judge panel deciding the case had erred, although rehearing is not sought each
time judges disagree with a panel. The formal bases for rehearing a case en banc
include the three desiderata of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35—conflict with
circuit precedent (intracircuit conflict), conflict with Supreme Court rulings, and
presence of an issue of “exceptional importance”—and courts’ rules and general
orders. Judges introduce other considerations, such as an intercircuit conflict,
institutional concerns about resources necessary to hear a case en banc, and whether a
case should proceed directly to the Supreme Court.
This Article presents a detailed description of reasons judges offer each other as they
seek to have a case taken en banc or argue against such rehearing after a three-judge
panel has filed its decision. The data are drawn from case files in the papers of Judge
Alfred T. Goodwin of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. He was the court’s en
banc coordinator from the early 1970s through 1993 and thus was at the
communications node for post-panel activity, which he monitored and directed.
Reasons offered for rehearing a case en banc are discussed in terms of the above-noted
FRAP categories, intercircuit conflict, and institutional reasons. Given particular
attention is the relationship between rehearing a case en banc or letting it proceed
quickly to the Supreme Court. Some general arguments by judges against en banc
hearing are also presented.

* Professor Emeritus of Political Science, University at Albany, State University of New York.
The Author currently resides in Eastham, Massachusetts. This Article was first presented at the
meeting of the Law and Society Association in San Francisco, California, on June 3, 2011. The Author
wishes to thank Judge Alfred T. Goodwin for access to the materials on which this Article draws and
Rory Little for his support. The Author may be contacted at wasb@albany.edu.
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Introduction
This Article is an examination of reasons U.S. court of appeals
judges offer each other, after a three-judge panel has filed its decision, as
they seek to have a case reheard en banc or argue against such rehearing.
Although as a formal matter, en banc rehearing is initiated by a petition
for rehearing en banc, in practical terms most activity directed to seeking
en banc hearing comes from the sua sponte actions of off-panel judges
troubled by a panel opinion and the resulting communication among
members of the court. We know little about that communication because
of lack of access to it, so the opportunity to see the judges’ messages
allows us to obtain a view of the activity related to en banc rehearing.
The U.S. courts of appeals sit en banc for a number of reasons,
although their opinions do not state reasons for doing so. The principal
factors said to explain which panel rulings will receive en banc rehearing
are a panel’s overturning a decision by a lower court or agency, a panel
member’s filing a dissent, and a panel ruling that runs in a liberal
1
direction. As published dissents from denial of en banc rehearing show,

1. Tracey E. George, The Dynamics and Determinants of the Decision to Grant En Banc Review,
74 Wash. L. Rev. 213, 220 (1999). For an examination of the effect of ideology (clearly related to
perceptions of whether the panel “got it right”) on whether a court sits en banc and reverses the panel,
see Phil Zarone, Agenda Setting in the Courts of Appeals: The Effect of Ideology on En Banc
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disagreements over issues of rights often serve as a trigger for activity
directed toward en banc rehearing. It is clear that the most likely reason
is that the judges believe the three-judge panel deciding the case had
erred, the converse being not seeking en banc rehearing because of
agreement with the panel’s result. Yet this is only one reason en banc
rehearing is sought. The formal bases include the three desiderata of
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure (“FRAP”) 35—conflict with circuit
precedent (intracircuit conflict), conflict with Supreme Court rulings, and
2
presence of an issue of “exceptional importance” —and the court’s rules
and general orders. The judges introduce other considerations, such as
possible intercircuit conflict and whether a case should be allowed to
proceed directly to the Supreme Court. As many of these elements are
open textured and provide considerable discretion in application, it is
hard to determine to what extent they channel the decision to rehear a
case en banc. Yet before we can get to that point, which is not considered
in this Article, we need to know what in fact the judges say to each other.
What follows is a highly descriptive initial exploration of reasons
judges use in arguing for—or against—en banc hearing. Those reasons
are offered in memoranda sent to other members of the court. While the
memoranda vary in length, the initial memorandum supporting an en
banc call is the equivalent of a short brief, and the judge’s clerks may
have been involved at least in part in its writing. Likewise, the panel’s
response—what amounts to a reply brief—is usually extended, prepared
after the clerks monitoring the case see the initial memorandum and
communicate their views to “their” judge. The further memoranda sent
in some cases are of varying lengths, with some quite extensive.
The communications on which this Article is based are drawn from
the papers of Judge Alfred T. Goodwin, senior judge of the Court of
3
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. As the court’s en banc coordinator from

Rehearings, 2 J. App. Prac. & Process 157 (2000) (examining the Fourth Circuit).
2. Fed. R. App. P. 35(b) (“A party may petition for a hearing or rehearing en banc. (1) The
petition must begin with a statement that either: (A) the panel decision conflicts with a decision of the
United States Supreme Court or of the court to which the petition is addressed (with citation to the
conflicting case or cases) and consideration by the full court is therefore necessary to secure and
maintain uniformity of the court’s decisions; or (B) the proceeding involves one or more questions of
exceptional importance, each of which must be concisely stated; for example, a petition may assert that
a proceeding presents a question of exceptional importance if it involves an issue on which the panel
decision conflicts with the authoritative decisions of other United States Courts of Appeals that have
addressed the issue.”).
3. The Author reviewed the Goodwin Papers while conducting research for this Article; the
unpublished documents cited here are available in the Goodwin Papers, which are held at the Oregon
Historical Society, Portland, Oregon. The Author has made every effort to ensure the accuracy of
citations to, and quotations from, those documents, but he notes that the editors of the Hastings Law
Journal have not had the opportunity to review the documents from the Goodwin Papers cited or
referred to here.
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the early 1970s through 1993, Judge Goodwin was at the communications
4
node for post-panel activity, which he monitored and directed. In this
Article the reasons judges offer, drawn from the extended period of
Judge Goodwin’s service, are grouped into basic categories—those of
FRAP 35 and other matters on which the judges regularly comment. No
attempt is made here to evaluate the validity of the claims judges make;
the focus is simply on the reasons proffered.
I. Reasons for Going En Banc

5

A. Overview
Determining precisely why a court of appeals has decided to rehear
a case en banc—or, infrequently, to hear a case en banc without a panel’s
first handing down a ruling (an “initial en banc”)—is difficult. Orders
granting rehearing en banc are not accompanied by a statement of
reasons for doing so, and most en banc opinions do not indicate why en
banc rehearing has been granted, although there are exceptions. For
example, in one case, the en banc court said that
this appeal presents us with a clear conflict in our precedent that gave
difficulty to the district court here and would give difficulty to other
district courts in the future if we did not address it. For that reason, we
6
voted to convene this en banc court to resolve this appeal . . . .

Indeed, one seldom knows from reading the en banc opinion that
the court has reheard the case; only West’s headnotes allow one to know
that a panel heard the case and what its action had been. Nor can one be
sure that the issues that are the focus of an en banc court’s opinion were
those that initially led a judge to call for en banc rehearing, as those
questions may have been sorted out and refined during the process

Unless otherwise specified, all those named as senders or recipients of memoranda are or were
judges of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. “Associates” refers to all judges of the court.
4. For a study of this role, see Stephen L. Wasby, “A Watchdog for the Good of the Order”: The
Ninth Circuit’s En Banc Coordinator, 12 J. App. Prac. & Process 91 (2011).
5. A preliminary exploration, on which the Author draws in small part, is provided in Stephen L.
Wasby, The Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals En Bancs, 33 McGeorge L. Rev. 17, 26–33 (2001)
[hereinafter Wasby, The Supreme Court], and Stephen L. Wasby, How Do Courts of Appeals En Banc
Decisions Fare in the U.S. Supreme Court, 85 Judicature 182, 182–83 (2002).
6. United States v. Washington, 593 F.3d 790, 797 (9th Cir. 2010). In a footnote, the court
explained that it had heard the case en banc before a panel decision was handed down. Id. at 797 n.9.
For another exception, see River of Life Ministries v. Village of Hazel Crest, where Judge Richard
Posner, for the en banc majority, says,
The existence of an intercircuit conflict with respect to the proper test for applying the
equal-terms provision [of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act],
combined with uncertainty about the consistency of our decisions, persuaded the full court
to hear the case in order to decide on a test.
611 F.3d 367, 368 (7th Cir. 2010).
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leading to the decision to rehear en banc, like the “issue fluidity” from
7
certiorari to final opinion in the Supreme Court. And it is important to
recognize that the issue that led some judges or a majority of the court to
vote to rehear a case en banc may not have been of major concern to
counsel, who may not have focused on it. We see this when, after the
court had decided to take a case en banc, a judge argued for additional
briefing because “[t]he original briefs did not address the issue for which
this case was taken en banc” and the issue “was discussed only sketchily”
8
when it arose on a post-appeal motion. Nor might the lawyers possess
the ability to deal effectively with the issue at hand, as we see when,
commenting on the possibility that the Supreme Court might modify the
panel’s opinion, a judge said, “The pity is that the lawyers probably are
9
not of the quality that will do the case justice.”
In a relatively recent statement, in responding to a motion for
clarification, a panel said:
[W]hen a case is heard or reheard en banc, the en banc panel assumes
jurisdiction over the entire case . . . regardless of the issue or issues that
may have caused any member of the Court to vote to hear the case en
banc. If the Court votes to hear or rehear a case en banc, the en banc
panel may, in its discretion, choose to limit the issues it
considers. . . . However, the en banc panel is under no obligation to do
10
so.

Ninth Circuit judges have discussed the question, raised by a judge,
whether there was “a procedure to take issues rather than cases en
11
banc,” with a colleague responding that the court had “never resolved”
the matter but had noted the informal means of taking the case but
12
focusing on the issue of concern. The court had earlier agreed to take
issues rather than whole cases en banc “when it was appropriate to do
so,” for example, in multi-issue cases where only one issue was contested
13
or potentially en banc worthy. And another judge making another en
banc request said, “If we now have a developed procedure for undertaking

7. See generally Kevin T. McGuire & Barbara Palmer, Issue Fluidity on the U.S. Supreme Court,
89 Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev. 691 (1995).
8. Memorandum from James R. Browning to the limited en banc panel (Aug. 6, 1986), Jensen v.
Stangel, 762 F.2d 815 (9th Cir.), appeal after remand, 790 F.2d 721 (9th Cir. 1985), and withdrawn en
banc sub nom. Jensen v. City of San Jose, 806 F.2d 899 (9th Cir. 1986).
9. Memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to Associates (Jan. 11, 1982), Ford Motor Co. v. Fed.
Trade Comm’n, 673 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1981).
10. Summerlin v. Stewart, 309 F.3d 1193, 1193 (9th Cir. 2002).
11. Memorandum from J. Clifford Wallace to active & senior judges (Oct. 10, 1989), Partington v.
Gedan, 880 F.2d 116 (9th Cir. 1989), vacated, 497 U.S. 1020 (1990), remanded to 914 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir.
1990), and rev’d en banc and vacated in part, 923 F.2d 686 (9th Cir. 1991).
12. Memorandum from Stephen Reinhardt to Associates (Oct. 10, 1989), Partington, 880 F.2d 116.
13. Memorandum from J. Clifford Wallace to Associates (May 8, 1978), United States v. Cook,
608 F.2d 1175 (9th Cir. 1977).
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en banc on one issue alone, this is an ideal case for that treatment.”
Indeed, the en banc court remanded that case to the panel to consider
15
the issues with which it had not dealt.
However, the court does focus on issues. This could be seen when,
16
after the case a panel sought to have heard en banc settled, one of the
judges who had been on the panel in that case noted that “we have the
same issue in another case,” and the panel called for en banc in the
17
second case. In dealing with the “need to settle the question whether
counsel has rendered effective assistance to his client in a criminal case,”
a judge showed that the court needed to consider the issue rather than
the particular case when he suggested that the court take the case under
discussion “or, I don’t care which, another case,” because “the best way
18
to do it is to take one or the other, or both . . . in banc.” It is possible for
judges to agree on a single issue for which en banc is being sought or
opposed, but at other times multiple issues may be under consideration.
Thus a judge found one case “complicated . . . because the majority
opinion, [the] dissent, the petition for rehearing, and [the] request for an
en banc vote all raise different issues,” with “[s]ome issues resulting from
Washington v. Davis, . . . some . . . independent of it, and some . . . mooted
19
by it.”
Judges’ statements during their exchange of memoranda may seem
to make clear why those judges favor or oppose en banc, but some judges
do not participate in such exchanges. Usually fewer than half send
memoranda in any given case. Some judges do not even vote on whether
to take a case en banc, even though doing so is the equivalent of a “No”
vote because an en banc hearing can occur only if a majority of
nonrecused active judges so vote. This leaves one to speculate whether
nonvoting results from being away from chambers, forgetting to vote, or
being disinterested. Even those who do make statements may have
multiple reasons for their votes, and a judge who votes to en banc a case
does not necessarily share the reasons offered by the judge who called

14. Memorandum from Shirley Hufstedler to Associates (Feb. 2, 1976), Confederated Bands &
Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation v. Washington, 550 F.2d 443 (9th Cir. 1977) (en banc).
15. Confederated Bands & Tribes, 550 F.2d at 449.
16. N.J. Life Ins. Co. v. Bostanian, No. 88-5815 (9th Cir.).
17. Memorandum from Betty B. Fletcher to Associates (Oct. 10, 1989), First State Ins. Co. v. W.
Inv. & Dev. Corp., 895 F.2d 1576 (9th Cir. 1990).
18. Memorandum from Ben C. Duniway to Associates (June 1, 1977), Cooper v. Fitzharris, 551
F.2d 1162 (9th Cir.), aff’d on reh’g en banc, 586 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1978). The “in banc” spelling was
preferred by Judge Duniway and some of his colleagues in the 1970s.
19. Memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to Associates (Feb. 21, 1977) (citing Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)), Davis v. Cnty. of L.A., Nos. 73-3008, 73-3009, 1976 WL 3779 (9th Cir. Oct.
20, 1976), withdrawn and superseded by 566 F.2d 1344 (9th Cir. 1977), vacated sub nom. Cnty. of L.A.
v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625 (1978).
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for a vote, as when a judge, saying he would support the en banc call
20
made by a colleague, said he was doing so for other reasons. There are
even times when a judge calling for en banc says he will vote against it, as
when an active judge called for en banc on behalf of his panel colleagues
because, as a senior circuit judge and a district judge, they could not do
21
so.
A vote on whether to en banc a case may also differ from the
position the judge took during the exchange of memoranda. In one such
situation, after voting was completed and the court had agreed to rehear
a case en banc, one judge asked the colleague who had made the en banc
call, “How can you vote against your own recommendation, especially
since your call triggered the expedited extraordinary shortened time
22
procedure?” The calling judge’s explanation, which serves to cast light
on the difference between disagreeing with an outcome and wishing to
have en banc rehearing, was that he had thought the case should have
been either heard en banc immediately or sent to the Supreme Court and
that he only called for en banc when another judge, also unhappy with
the panel ruling, would not agree to expedited proceedings. As the first
judge put it, “I called for an en banc vote because I believe that given
your desire for a vote a vote should be taken. That is obviously far
different than calling for a vote because one believes a case should go en
23
banc.”
What are the reasons that judges offer when they seek to have a
panel’s ruling reheard en banc? A judge commenting on an exchange of
memos about taking a case en banc offered a nonexhaustive list of
reasons why a case would be reheard en banc that was “merely
illustrative of the type of reasons we appear to have gone en banc in the
past.”
We take a case en banc if the panel resolved an important legal issue in
a manner contrary to established law, if the panel failed to follow Ninth
Circuit precedent, if it created an unnecessary conflict another circuit,
or perhaps even if it merely adopted a novel and unacceptable
principle of law that will cause serious problems for the court or
require unnecessary Supreme Court review. We may also go en banc

20. See Memorandum from Stephen Trott to Associates (Aug. 23, 2001), United States v.
Buckland, 259 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2001), rev’d en banc, 277 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2002).
21. Memorandum from Stephen Reinhardt to Associates (July 16, 1986), United States v.
Yarbrough, 797 F.2d 979 (9th Cir. 1986) (unpublished table decision).
22. Memorandum from Diarmuid O’Scannlain to Stephen Reinhardt & Associates (Sept. 14, 2001),
Buckland, 259 F.3d 1157.
23. Memorandum from Stephen Reinhardt to Diarmuid O’Scannlain & Associates (Sept. 15, 2001),
Buckland, 259 F.3d 1157.
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because a conflict must be resolved for housekeeping reasons even
24
though the case is of no particular significance.

Stated more generally and going beyond that statement, reasons
why judges want to go en banc include the following:
 They may simply agree, or disagree, with the result reached by the
panel;
 While agreeing with the panel’s result, they may disagree with the
panel opinion;
 They may be persuaded by a panel dissent;
 They may believe that the panel’s opinion sets up an intracircuit
conflict;
 They may believe that the panel’s opinion creates an intercircuit
conflict;
 They may believe that the panel’s opinion conflicts with or is an
improper interpretation of a Supreme Court ruling;
 They may believe that, because of an intervening Supreme Court
ruling, circuit precedent must be changed, or at least reexamined;
 Independent of agreement or disagreement with the panel result or
opinion, they may believe that the case is, or is not, of sufficient
importance to warrant en banc consideration; or
 They may be concerned that the court is taking “too many” cases
en banc.

A judge seeking en banc rehearing may combine different elements
in a memorandum supporting an en banc call. Such a combination is
evident in one judge’s complaint that the panel’s ruling “contradicts the
plain language of the [statute], conflicts with a prior decision of this
circuit, and creates a needless intercircuit conflict with all courts of
25
appeals that have addressed the issue” and in another that alleged
creation of an intercircuit conflict, contravention of a Supreme Court
26
decision, and creation of a conflict within the circuit’s own law. These
assertions came in published dissents, but such combined claims are also
regularly found in the judges’ prior discussion over taking cases en banc.
For example, in the course of arguing that a panel had produced an
opinion that conflicted with Ninth Circuit precedent and “also needlessly
creates an intercircuit conflict,” a judge also claimed that “the decision
conflicts with Supreme Court precedent,” which he went on to analyze at
27
some length. In a labor-election case, a judge stopped the clock, that is,

24. Memorandum from Stephen Reinhardt to Associates (Jan. 26, 1987), Warren v. Bowen, 804
F.2d 1120 (9th Cir. 1986), amended on denial of reh’g by 817 F.2d 63 (9th Cir. 1987).
25. Nw. Envtl. Advocates v. City of Portland, 74 F.3d 945, 948 (9th Cir. 1996) (O’Scannlain,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). The panel disposition is at 56 F.2d 959 (9th Cir. 1995).
26. Indian Oasis-Baboquivari Unified Sch. Dist. No. 40 v. Kirk, 91 F.3d 1240, 1245 (9th Cir. 1995)
(Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
27. Memorandum from J. Clifford Wallace to active & senior judges (Mar. 4, 1993), United States
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asked for a suspension of deadlines for en banc calls so the panel could
reconsider its work, “because the opinion is arguably in conflict with
Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent,” with intercircuit matters
further implicated because an earlier Ninth Circuit ruling utilized by the
28
present panel drew on a Fifth Circuit case. Although in a later memo
the calling judge made clear that his “major concern is to keep Ninth
29
Circuit law intact,” he added the claim of intercircuit conflict. This
judge also combined claims in a case concerning the law of search and
seizure, saying that “the decision conflicts with Supreme Court precedent
30
and with our own. It also needlessly creates an intercircuit conflict.”
These multiple elements may be interwoven. Claims of intercircuit
conflict are related to other elements, as when an intercircuit conflict is
31
said to be mirrored by intracircuit divisions. The mixture of intra- and
intercircuit conflict claims is illustrated in two cases in which the panel
itself made a sua sponte en banc call before issuing its ruling. In a drugconspiracy case, briefs and oral argument had convinced the panel “that
32
Ninth Circuit opinions are in conflict.” Although not the basis for the
panel’s en banc call, intercircuit conflict was also implicated because the
Ninth Circuit cases cited to a Fifth Circuit ruling based on that circuit’s
doctrine, which conflicted with the Ninth Circuit’s, and because, as the
panel noted, “This circuit stands alone in its interpretation” of the relevant
33
statute. Then in an immigration case, when the panel had sought en banc
hearing because of an intracircuit conflict, a judge who had sat on the
allegedly conflicting case suggested it could be distinguished, but in so
34
doing, introduced mention of an existing intercircuit conflict.
Because piling claim on claim may create a stronger position than
would a focus on only one element, it is not unusual to find a panel
dissenter or off-panel judge combining a complaint about an intercircuit
conflict with objections to other sins committed by the panel majority.
We see this in a dissent to an en banc court’s holding that materiality is
an element of the offense of making a false statement in a matter within

v. Mota, 982 F.2d 1384 (9th Cir. 1994).
28. Memorandum from J. Clifford Wallace to panel (Oct. 8, 1992), Am. W. Airlines v. Nat’l
Mediation Bd., 969 F.2d 777 (9th Cir. 1992).
29. Memorandum from J. Clifford Wallace to panel (Jan. 19, 1993), Am. W. Airlines, 969 F.2d 777.
30. Memorandum from J. Clifford Wallace to active & senior judges (Mar. 4, 1993), Mota, 982
F.2d 1384.
31. See In re Yochum, 89 F.3d 661, 666 (9th Cir. 1996) (“This intra-circuit conflict mirrors the
circuit split.”).
32. Memorandum from panel to Associates (Feb. 9, 1993), United States v. Shabani, 993 F.2d
1419 (9th Cir. 1992), rev’d, 513 U.S. 10 (1994).
33. Id.
34. Memorandum from Mary M. Schroeder to Associates (July 7, 1992), Butros v. INS, 990 F.2d
1142 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc).
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a government agency’s jurisdiction. In that dissent, Judge Alex Kozinski,
calling the majority’s opinion a “tsunami,” stated,
It’s not every day, after all, that we provoke a conflict with every other
regional circuit, defy Supreme Court authority, implicitly overrule
several lines of our own case law—thereby creating a spiderweb of
secondary circuit conflicts—and pave the way for successful habeas
petitions for scores, perhaps hundreds, of prisoners convicted of a
35
broad range of federal crimes.

Judge Kozinski also, in calling for en banc rehearing in another case
in which the panel allowed a suit by people injured while attempting to
steal wire on a former military installation, said the panel had handed
down “a most remarkable ruling,” which was “not merely unsupported
by the facts of this case or by legal authority” but also “offends common
sense and disconnected the rule of law from standards of morality” and
36
“shocks the conscience.”
With litanies like these, one is surprised not to see claims of crimes
against man and nature, and they make it appear that a judge may be
throwing mud at the wall in the hopes that some will stick. They also
reinforce the notion that many such claims are used as rhetorical devices.
Indeed, a judge’s overblown rhetoric may scare off colleagues and
definitely prompts rejoinders. While another judge agreed that the latter
case should have been heard en banc, he drafted a separate opinion to
note “that the failure of a circuit to take a case en banc does not
37
necessarily presage the early fall of the Republic.”
While some judges focus more on one (or some) of the reasons for
going en banc and may pay particular heed to specific areas of the law in
which they are more likely to think that their colleagues have “gone
wrong,” often the reasons given for—or against—en banc rehearing are
used to support the judge’s own position, with a reason used to seek en
banc rehearing in one case but used as a shield against taking en banc
other rulings the judge likes. This was well captured in a doggerel by the
late Judge Joseph Sneed, entitled All One Needs to Know About En
Banc Memos:

35. United States v. Gaudin, 28 F.3d 943, 955 (9th Cir. 1994) (Kozinski, J., dissenting). Despite
the hyperbole, the Supreme Court, which listens not infrequently to Judge Kozinski, affirmed. See
United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 (1995).
36. Memorandum from Alex Kozinski to Associates (June 19, 1987), Henderson v. United States,
734 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1984), amended and superseded by 784 F.2d 942 (9th Cir. 1986), withdrawn and
superseded in part by 827 F.2d 1233 (9th Cir. 1987), and withdrawn and superseded by 846 F.2d 1233
(9th Cir. 1988). The citations indicate that the panel revised the opinion multiple times. Although the
calling judge at one point circulated a dissent from denial of rehearing en banc, the panel’s changes
apparently led him not to file it.
37. Alfred T. Goodwin, Draft opinion dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc (undated),
Henderson, 734 F.2d 483.
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Your case is an abomination
To our fair part of this great nation,
Banishment by en banc it must be,
Your mess the Supremes must never see.
But my great case, vital and profound,
Addresses issues in ways so sound
Which the wise Supremes will not ignore,
So let not your en banc block their door.
Our en banc memos do so opine,
38
First when your case and then next when mine.

B. Specific Reasons
We now turn to examine more closely some of the basic categories
of reasons proffered for—or against—hearing a case en banc. We begin
with claims that the panel erred (“got it wrong”) and then turn to
elements of FRAP 35—intracircuit conflict, conflict with the Supreme
Court, and “exceptional importance”—before turning to intercircuit
conflict and institutional reasons for not proceeding en banc. This is
followed by discussion of some general reasons offered for not taking
cases en banc. The last Part of this Article focuses on the relationship
between rehearing cases en banc and their progress toward the Supreme
Court.
1. “The Panel Got It Wrong”
The most likely reason for rehearing en banc is that judges do not
like the panel’s ruling. As Justice Antonin Scalia stated to the
Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of
Appeals (the “White Commission”), en banc review was intended “to
39
correct and deter panel opinions that are pretty clearly wrong.”
Whatever else judges may assert, their memoranda supporting en banc
40
rehearing “almost invariably argue that the panel opinion is erroneous.”
And in their published dissents from denials of en banc rehearings,
judges speak most often to the substance of the panel’s ruling; they argue
41
that, for one or another reason, the panel erred. Arthur Hellman has

38. Memorandum from Joseph Sneed to Associates (Nov. 10, 1987). He commented: “An idle
mind (a sometime benefit of senior status) is a doggerelist’s workshop. The poor lines below do not
beggar truth, however. Don’t get me wrong—I enjoy reading memoranda that reflect passionate
outrage.” Id.
39. Letter from Justice Antonin Scalia to Justice Byron White, Comm’n on Structural
Alternatives for the Fed. Courts of Appeals (Aug. 21, 1998).
40. Arthur D. Hellman, Getting It Right: Panel Error and the En Banc Process in the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals, 34 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 425, 455 n.104 (2000).
41. For a clear published statement about “getting it wrong,” see the comment of Sixth Circuit
Judge Jeffrey Sutton: “With all respect to the panel majority, this case was not decided correctly.”
Mitts v. Bagley, 626 F.3d 366, 366 (6th Cir. 2010) (Sutton, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc).
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indicated that this occurs both for panel rulings that favor individual
42
rights and for those favoring the government.
When off-panel judges debate with the panel over the correctness of
interpretation of statutes or constitutional provisions or question a rule
the panel has adopted, they really are saying the panel “got in wrong,”
even though they do not do so in haec verba. In a sentencing case, a
judge calling for en banc thought the panel had interpreted the statute in
43
a way that “frustrates the congressional intent behind those provisions,”
and another judge, supporting the call, said “the majority’s
interpretation . . . destroys the delicate balance between the legislative,
44
executive and judicial roles in sentencing.” However, a judge opposed
to en banc rehearing in that case found no ambiguity in the statute and
“nothing odd or irrational about the majority’s reading of Section
45
4205.” When, in addition to saying that the panel was wrong, judges add
other reasons for en bancing a case, such as the presence of an
intracircuit or intercircuit conflict, it may be just another way of saying
“This is a really bad decision” and that the panel “got it very wrong.” The
centrality of “the panel got it wrong” is seen in a law clerk’s suggestion
that, despite the importance of the securities case at issue, “unless you
46
disagree with the result, this is not a reason for rehearing.”
Examples of language indicating that a judge calling for en banc
believed the panel “got it wrong” are numerous. Thus a panel majority’s
decision was said to make “bad law which is sure to haunt us for many
47
years.” This was echoed by the panel’s dissenter in response to the
majority’s defense of its opinion even though he had not voted in the
panel to rehear the case en banc: “I predict that if allowed to stand, [this
48
case] will come back to haunt us . . . for lack of standards.” A panel in a
case concerning a life sentence with or without parole was said to have
49
“applied an incorrect standard,” and another judge objected that a
panel opinion adopted a standard that placed too high a burden on the
50
government. To say that “[s]trong policy considerations are at war with
42. Hellman, supra note 40, at 449.
43. Memorandum from William Canby to Associates (July 30, 1986), United States v. Gwaltney,
790 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1986).
44. Memorandum from Warren Ferguson to Associates (Aug. 4, 1986), Gwaltney, 790 F.2d 1378.
45. Memorandum from Alex Kozinski to Associates (Aug. 8 1986), Gwaltney, 790 F.2d 1378.
46. Memorandum from Barbara Reeves, Law Clerk, to Alfred T. Goodwin (Nov. 8, 1973), Manor
Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 492 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1973), rev’d, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
47. Memorandum from Cynthia Holcomb Hall to Associates (Nov. 15, 1988), Keith v. Volpe, 858
F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1988).
48. Memorandum from William Norris to Associates (Dec. 1, 1988), Keith, 858 F.2d 467. He later
supported the en banc call.
49. Memorandum from William Canby to Associates (Jan. 20, 1993), Payne v. Borg, 982 F.2d 335
(9th Cir. 1982).
50. Memorandum from Alex Kozinski to Associates (Mar. 27, 1973), United States v. Vasquez-
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51

the majority’s conclusion” is yet another version of “they got it wrong.”
So is the comment, by a former district judge who had handled a case
similar to the one then before him for en banc consideration, that
“several of my lawyer and non-lawyer knowledgeable friends insist that it
is a misguided decision,” although the judge conceded this “lends very
52
little to the persuasiveness of en banc consideration.”
Another type of panel error can be seen when a judge called for en
banc hearing because, while he thought “the majority has correctly stated
53
the law,” he believed it “then has completely misapplied it.” In an
interesting twist in the same case, the panel author, after considering
memoranda from the panel dissenter and several off-panel colleagues,
recognized the problem they had posed and said that “en banc hearing
54
might not be a bad idea, if only to establish clarity.” And in a case about
an adult-entertainment zoning ordinance, a judge calling for en banc,
beyond disputing the substance of the panel’s ruling, objected to its use
of an unpublished disposition in the case, saying that the court’s own
55
rules required publication because the ruling was clarifying the law.
Also complaining in an en banc call about the use of an unpublished
disposition was a judge who, in addition to being concerned about a rule
application, said there was also “an important issue as to whether we
should dispose of capital appeals in unreasoned dispositions, at least
56
when significant legal issues may be present.”
The result orientation of en banc calls can be seen in the use by that
judge, who elsewhere stated that all capital cases should receive en banc
57
58
treatment, of the term “injustice” in relation to panel holdings. And
one can also see judges defending their own previous rulings—with latter
panels not “getting it right”—when the judges of an earlier panel felt a
later panel had undone their work and thus called for en banc rehearing

Chan, 978 F.2d 546 (9th Cir. 1992). In another instance of piling on “wrongs,” he added that the panel
“has done much more than merely bollix its review of the facts” but had produced “a terrible idea” in
addition to being “inconsistent with the precedents of the Supreme Court and this court.”
51. Memorandum from Alex Kozinski to Associates (June 19, 1987), Henderson v. United States,
734 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1984).
52. Memorandum from J. Blaine Anderson to Associates (June 25, 1987), Henderson, 734 F.2d 483.
53. Memorandum from Procter Hug, Jr. to Associates (Aug. 7, 1995), Roy v. Gomez, 55 F.3d
1483 (9th Cir. 1995), rev’d en banc, 81 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 1996), vacated sub nom. California v. Roy,
519 U.S. 2 (1996). Judge Hug said he found it “frustrating” to have to make an en banc call here.
54. Memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to Associates (Aug. 21, 1995), Roy, 55 F.3d 1483.
55. Memorandum from William Norris to Associates (Apr. 19, 1983), Playtime Theatres v. City of
Tacoma, 694 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1982) (unpublished table decision).
56. Memorandum from Stephen Reinhardt to Associates (Sept. 15, 2000), United States v. ZunoArce, 209 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2000), amended by 245 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2001).
57. In the early 1970s, there were many calls to take Selective Service cases, particularly those
involving conscientious objectors (C.O.s) en banc.
58. Memorandum from Stephen Reinhardt to Associates (Sept. 15, 2000), Zuno-Arce, 209 F.3d 1095.
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because they had “unanimously concluded precisely the opposite of what
the panel has now held,” with nothing having taken place since—“no
intervening statute, Supreme Court decision, or en banc decision of this
59
court” to call their ruling into question. In short, we were right and they
are wrong—plus we were first.
One could assume that a judge’s panel dissent would indicate that
this judge believed the panel “got it wrong,” so basing an en banc call on
that dissent is a way of saying the panel was wrong. At times the en banc
60
call simply points to the dissent as the call’s basis. For example, a judge
indicated that he would base his en banc call on lack of consistency with
61
circuit precedent, “for reasons that Judge Koelsch states in his dissent.”
And the judge calling for en banc on the validity of the Hawaii Land
Reform Act said, “When contrasted with Judge Ferguson’s excellent
62
dissent, the majority opinion seems clearly wrong.” Likewise, a judge
relying on the panel dissent in his call said, “Judge Nelson’s excellent
63
dissent leaves me with nothing more to say in support of my call.” In
another case, a judge calling for en banc said a panel member’s partial
dissent “makes the point better than I could, and there is no point
repeating his position here”—although he did go on to raise and discuss
64
an additional point.
Some judges think, however, that simply pointing to the panel
dissent as the basis for an en banc call is insufficient to satisfy the
65
General Order 5.2(b) language “with a memorandum setting forth the
66
reasons” for the call. This could be because a panel dissent might focus
solely on that particular case and not indicate larger problems with
circuit precedent or focus on a particular issue which others thought en
banc-worthy. And, although judges do base en banc calls on a panel
59. Memorandum from William Fletcher, Harry Pregerson & Ronald Gould to Associates (May
10, 2006), United States v. Novak, 441 F.3d 819 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated en banc and remanded, 476
F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2007).
60. For example, “I call for an en banc vote based on Judge O’Scannlain’s dissent in this case.”
Memorandum from Harry Pregerson to Associates (June 12, 1992), Jordan v. Gardner, 953 F.2d 1137
(9th Cir. 1992), aff’d en banc, 986 F.2d 1521 (9th Cir. 1993); see Memorandum from William Canby to
Associates (June 17, 1992), Jordan, 953 F.2d 1137 (“And we should right the wrong so eloquently
described by Judge O’Scannlain.”).
61. Memorandum from Shirley Hufstedler to Associates (Oct. 7, 1975), Wiren v. Eide, 542 F.2d
757 (9th Cir. 1976).
62. Memorandum from William Norris to Associates (June 1, 1983), Midkiff v. Tom, 702 F.2d 788
(9th Cir. 1983), rev’d sub nom. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
63. Memorandum from William Norris to Associates (Dec. 22, 1986), Hughes v. Idaho State Bd.
of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905 (9th Cir. 1986).
64. Memorandum from William Canby to Associates (July 30, 1986), United States v. Gwaltney,
790 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1986).
65. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, General Orders, Order 5.2(b) (2008).
66. Memorandum from Robert Boochever to Associates (Oct. 8, 1982), Ronwin v. State Bar of
Ariz. 686 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1981).
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dissent, they may go further, as one judge did in saying that, while he
agreed with the dissenter’s concerns, “I write to emphasize my own
67
concerns,” which he then enumerated.
Yet a judge who dissents from a panel opinion does not necessarily
seek to have the case reheard en banc. At times, the dissenter might vote
for panel rehearing but not for en banc rehearing, an indication that not
all cases thought erroneously decided are believed worthy of en banc
rehearing. Conversely, a case might be thought worthy of en banc
68
rehearing but not of panel rehearing. In other instances, the dissenter
might not initially seek en banc rehearing but later might join other
judges who have done so. In one case that later reached the Supreme
Court, the panel had been divided, and the majority opinion’s author
transmitted to his court colleagues a message from the dissenting judge,
who did not, at that time, “intend to activate an en banc vote, because I
have spoken my piece in dissent,” but who stated that, should someone
else seek to take the case en banc, “I would join in an affirmative en banc
69
vote.” The possible disjuncture between panel dissent and (not) seeking
rehearing en banc is also made clear in the observation by the panel
majority’s author that, while he had written many dissents, he had
requested en banc rehearing in only two, one of which he regretted even
70
though his position was adopted by the en banc court. His stance about
not voting for en banc came from the “teaching” of a late judge “that we
should not take cases en banc simply because we disagree with the results
71
by the panel majorities.” Given that en banc rehearing is not sought in
all cases in which a judge disagrees with the result, it is perhaps not
surprising that judges are selective in seeking en banc rehearing and that
they look for cases that they think are the “more appropriate vehicle
for . . . reconsideration of the rule in general,” even if it means shifting an
72
en banc call from one case to another.
What response can be made when judges seek en banc rehearing
because the panel “got it wrong”? One is that the judge calling for en

67. Memorandum from Charles Wiggins to Associates (June 25, 1986), Jensen v. City of San Jose,
806 F.2d 899 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc).
68. See this comment by a staff attorney: “Whether the case should be given rehearing en banc is
perhaps a closer question than whether reconsideration by the panel is warranted.” Memorandum
from Norm Vance, Civil Motions Attorney, to panel (Oct. 21, 1986), In re Wash. Pub. Power Supply
Sys. Sec. Litig., 823 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1987) (en banc).
69. Memorandum from James R. Browning to Associates (Nov. 9, 1973), Manor Drug Stores v.
Blue Chip Stamps, 492 F.2d 136 (9th Cir.1973) (reporting the views of Judge Shirley Hufstedler).
70. Memorandum from Walter Ely to Associates (Oct. 17, 1978), United States v. Deal, 587 F.2d
956 (9th Cir. 1978).
71. Id.
72. Memorandum from Stephen Reinhardt to Associates (Sept. 15, 2000), United States v. ZunoArce, 209 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2000), amended by 245 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2001).
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banc is simply seeking a different result. In one case in which the panel
dissenter had said in an en banc call that the majority “establishes
dangerous precedent, striking at the very heart of the protections
73
afforded by the Fourth Amendment,” the panel author’s rejoinder was
that the calling judge “overstates the importance of that part of the
majority opinion that he dislikes and understates the importance of that
74
part he likes.” In another case, when an off-panel judge noted the
calling judge’s “extrapolated parade of horribles” and hoped the panel
“sees through this fire and brimstone approach and rejects his effort to
75
get the . . . panel (or an en banc panel) to reach his own desired result,”
the panel pushed back by saying that the conflicts to which the caller had
pointed “are based on an extravagant misinterpretation of our opinion”
(saying in effect that the challenger had “got it wrong”) and by asserting
that “convening an en banc court to address . . . disagreement with the
result reached in our opinion would be . . . a poor use of eleven judges’
76
time.” Likewise, in another case in which the calling judge had made a
strong, multipronged attack on the panel’s opinion, the panel responded
that it had only remanded for determinations on several key matters and
had “decided none of the principal issues about which the government
77
and [the] Judge . . . complain.”
Another response is that disagreement with a panel result does not
warrant having an en banc. A judge who disagrees with a panel ruling
could nonetheless vote against en banc rehearing because, as a Sixth
Circuit judge stated the matter, “No one thinks a vote against rehearing
78
en banc is an endorsement of a panel decision.” Illustrative of this view
is a Ninth Circuit judge’s observation, “I do not feel the majority
79
opinions so clearly wrong as to warrant en banc reconsideration,” and
another commented, “To date, merely bad law has not made questions
80
en-banc-worthy.” These remarks were but other statements of the idea
that the court could not rehear en banc each case some thought wrongly

73. Memorandum from Cecil Poole to Associates (Dec. 31, 1986), United States v. Freitas, 800
F.2d 1451 (9th Cir. 1986).
74. Memorandum from Joseph Sneed to Associates (Jan. 8, 1987), Freitas, 800 F.2d 1451.
75. Memorandum from Cecil Poole to all judges (Mar. 30, 1993), United States v. Vasquez-Chan,
978 F.2d 546 (9th Cir. 1992).
76. Memorandum from panel to Associates (Apr. 12, 1993), Vasquez-Chan, 978 F.2d 546.
77. Memorandum from Dorothy W. Nelson to Associates (July 3, 1987), Henderson v. United
States, 734 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1984).
78. Mitts v. Bagley, 626 F.3d 366, 370 (6th Cir. 2010) (Sutton, J., concurring in denial of rehearing
en banc).
79. Vote memorandum from Walter Ely (Sept. 26, 1976), Harmsen v. Smith, 542 F.2d 496 (9th
Cir. 1976).
80. Memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to Associates (Feb. 24, 1977), Davis v. Cnty. of L.A.,
Nos. 73-3008, 73-3009, 1976 WL 3779 (9th Cir. Oct. 20, 1976), withdrawn and superseded by 566 F.2d
1344 (9th Cir. 1977), vacated sub nom. Cnty. of L.A. v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625 (1978).
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decided. In also opposing an en banc call, Judge James Browning stated
that he thought the problems to which Judge Goodwin, who had called
for en banc, referred “are no more difficult or important than dozens of
81
others that constantly face the court.” The distinction between
disagreeing with a case result and supporting en banc hearing is quite
clear in the statement by one of the court’s then senior members, who
wrote, “Ordinarily I would not call for a hearing in banc merely because
I felt that a panel’s distinction of a previous decision of ours would not
hold water. If we all started doing that, we would drown in a sea of in
82
bancs.” And if simple disagreement with a panel’s result or holding was
not by itself enough to warrant en banc rehearing, how much less so
when the disagreement was over dictum in a panel ruling? As one judge
put it, increased caseload meant that “an en banc on dicta is a luxury this
83
court can ill afford.”
The converse of seeking en banc rehearing to correct panel error is
not rehearing cases en banc because of agreement with the result.
However, that is only part of the reason, for as we have just seen, judges
do not call for en banc rehearing each and every time they disagree with
the panel’s result. As Hellman has observed, even “the fact that the
panel’s result would not prevail in the full court does not necessarily
84
mean that the case will go en banc.” Some judges may not care about
the panel’s ruling one way or the other; that is, rulings can be said to fall
within their “zone of indifference.” Others may disagree with the panel’s
ruling but not have much passion about it, as when “they believe that the
panel opinion, although perhaps erroneous, is not important enough to
85
warrant en banc correction.” We see this when, in a case which relied
on a prior circuit ruling, a judge demonstrated that possible disagreement
with a ruling would not be enough to lead him to initiate en banc activity.
He said he would “shed no tears” if the Supreme Court or the circuit
were to reverse the earlier case, but he “would ask someone else to do
86
the hatchet work.”

81. Memorandum from James R. Browning to Associates (Apr. 25, 1973), United States v. Price,
474 F.2d 1223 (9th Cir.), reh’g denied, 484 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1973).
82. Memorandum from Ben C. Duniway to Richard Chambers (June 27, 1973), Deep v. United
States, 497 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1974). He thought this case different because of a concern stated by the
Solicitor General in supporting rehearing en banc.
83. Memorandum from Thomas Tang, Betty Fletcher & Stephen Reinhardt to Associates (Apr.
13, 1992), United States v. Powell, 936 F.2d 1056 (9th Cir.), amended and superseded by 955 F.2d 1206
(9th Cir. 1991).
84. Arthur D. Hellman, Precedent, Predictability, and Federal Appellate Structure, 60 U. Pitt. L.
Rev. 1029, 1049 (1999).
85. Hellman, supra note 40, at 454.
86. Memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to Associates (Mar. 1, 1979), Walker v. Loggins, 608
F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1979). The earlier case was Bittaker v. Enomoto, 587 F.2d 400 (9th Cir. 1978).
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2. Intracircuit Conflict
A not uncommon claim in calls for en banc rehearing is that a direct
conflict exists between a present panel ruling and prior circuit precedent.
The importance of such claimed intracircuit conflict to the question of en
banc rehearing is evident in explanations by judges on both sides of going
en banc. One who opposed an en banc call said, “I have some doubt
about the result, but there is no conflict with any other decision of our
87
court,” and one who supported en banc, while arguing that the court
was, “in good conscience, bound to take a case en banc when necessary
to secure and maintain uniformity of our decisions,” felt compelled to
note that “apparently there is no case squarely in conflict” with the case,
with no one having found another Ninth Circuit ruling that “reaches the
88
astonishing result reached.”
A claim of intracircuit conflict sometimes takes the form that two
panels ruling on the same issue have produced results in conflict, or at
least in tension, with each other. Thus, in an immigration case in which
“firm resettlement” elsewhere was said to bar asylum, the judge initiating
en banc proceedings called the panel’s ruling “the clearest possible case
of a panel violating directly controlling precedent in order to reach a
result it desires” and added that it “creates the paradigmatic conflict
necessitating en banc review,” making the ruling “indeed a poster-child
both for how a panel may not act and for when the court must go en
89
banc.” If conflict is not head-on, nonetheless a panel may be said to
have inadequately distinguished its case from previous ones, thus leaving
an intracircuit conflict with which the full court must deal. More serious
is the claim that the panel has gone further and “overruled” a previous
90
decision or even “improperly” done so. Part of these arguments is that a
latter panel’s ruling said to be contrary to an earlier one would introduce
91
“instability” in circuit precedent.
Other examples of claimed intracircuit conflict are legion, perhaps
because it appears to be the most frequently cited reason for an en banc
call. For example, a ruling on reasonable suspicion to support a Border
Patrol investigatory stop was challenged as “in direct conflict with prior
87. Memorandum from James R. Browning to Associates (Oct. 27, 1975), United States v. Hall,
543 F.2d 1229 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc).
88. Alfred T. Goodwin, Draft opinion dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc (undated),
Henderson v. United States, 734 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1984).
89. Memorandum from Stephen Reinhardt to Associates (Dec. 20, 2005), Maharaj v. Gonzales,
416 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2005), rev’d en banc, 450 F.3d 961 (9th Cir. 2006).
90. Memorandum from William Fletcher, Harry Pregerson & Ronald Gould to Associates (May
10, 2006), United States v. Novak, 441 F.3d 819 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated en banc and remanded, 476
F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2007). The case said to have been overruled was United States v. Jackson, 229 F.3d
1223 (9th Cir. 2000).
91. Memorandum from William Fletcher to judges (July 11, 2006), Novak, 441 F.3d 819.
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92

circuit precedent,” and in another border-search case, the calling judge
said, “I do not believe the majority opinion can be reconciled with” three
93
Ninth Circuit cases, as the dissenter had pointed out. Another judge,
who believed the panel opinion “conflicted with prior decisions of this
court,” called for en banc rehearing after the panel revised its opinion,
94
because “the conflicts remain.” In a case on the Clean Water Act
conviction of a sewage-treatment plant manager, a judge stated his
concern “that the decision does not seriously address a prior decision
95
with which it may be inconsistent.” And still another judge said that a
panel ruling on a city adult-entertainment zoning ordinance had “applied
a test . . . that conflict[s] with the test applied by the Supreme
96
Court . . . and by the Ninth Circuit in two cases.” In a Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 11 case, a judge had “collected . . . from a stack of recent
slip opinions” to show that panels were going in different directions as to
sanctions for misconduct on appeal, which led him to “conclude that the
97
law of this circuit is in a state of confusion.”
Although intracircuit conflict is alleged most often by an off-panel
judge, apparent conflict or tension between two or more previous cases
might lead a panel trying to reconcile those conflicting cases to seek en
banc hearing of their case to undo the confusion. A panel dealing with
copyright liability found an intracircuit conflict between the case they
98
thought controlling and subsequent cases. Another panel that found a
“disagreement between the panels’ approaches” thought en banc was
necessary to reevaluate a prior rule, particularly as there was “sufficient
confusion about the status of our circuit’s law in this area that our court
99
should be concerned.” The author of another panel’s proposed opinion
100
reported that the panel “could not reconcile the holdings” in two cases
92. Memorandum from Cynthia Holcomb Hall to Associates (Mar. 12, 1993), United States v.
Rodriguez, 976 F.2d 592 (9th Cir. 1992), amended on denial of reh’g by 997 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir. 1993).
93. Memorandum from Shirley Hufstedler to Associates (Oct. 7, 1975), Wiren v. Eide, 542 F.2d
757 (9th Cir. 1976).
94. Memorandum from J. Clifford Wallace to active & senior judges (Mar. 31, 1992), United
States v. Powell, 936 F.2d 1056 (9th Cir.), amended and superseded by 955 F.2d 1206 (9th Cir. 1991).
95. Memorandum from Andrew Kleinfeld to Associates (Dec. 23, 1993), United States v.
Weitzenhoff, 1 F.3d 1523 (9th Cir. 1993).
96. Memorandum from William Norris to Associates (Apr. 19, 1983), Playtime Theatres v. City of
Tacoma, 694 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1982) (unpublished table decision).
97. Memorandum from Charles Wiggins to Associates (Sept. 29, 1989), Partington v. Gedan, 880
F.2d 116 (9th Cir. 1989).
98. Memorandum from panel to all active judges (Aug. 23, 1993), Subafilms v. MGM-Pathe
Commc’ns Co., 988 F.2d 122 (9th Cir. 1993) (unpublished table decision), vacated in part and
remanded en banc, 24 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 1994).
99. Memorandum from Betty B. Fletcher to Associates (Aug. 31, 1989), First State Ins. Co. v. W.
Inv. & Dev. Corp., 895 F.2d 1576 (9th Cir. 1990).
100. Memorandum from Robert Beezer to Associates (July 6, 1993), N. Star Alaska v. United
States, 1 F.3d 967 (9th Cir.), remanded en banc, 9 F.3d 1430 (9th Cir. 1993).
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and, after messages from one judge saying that the court had agreed
“that an en banc call should be made when opinions by our court cannot
101
be reconciled,” did call for en banc consideration. However, another
judge, arguing that “panel opinions in conflict with earlier decisions
should be taken en banc,” did not think the court should pick and choose
the way the Supreme Court did: “We should not use our in banc
machinery where direct conflicts exist . . . as if it were a certiorari
102
process.”
A frequent response to a claim of intracircuit inconsistency is that
the cases can be distinguished. Dealing with a request for initial en banc
presented to a motions panel, a staff attorney said of the argument that
two earlier cases were inconsistent, “I submit that the two cases could be
distinguished by the fact that they each involve different types of casino
103
transactions.” Responding to another en banc call, the author of the
panel majority’s per curiam opinion said the majority was “satisfied that
the distinction we have drawn between this case and [another]” was
adequate, but he went on to “recognize that it might well be argued that
104
it is not.” He then made the interesting offer that if the members of the
panel in the other case then being considered on the issue “think we have
dealt unfairly with” that case, the present panel majority would join in an
105
en banc call. One judge put well the question of whether conflicts really
exist when, in responding to an en banc call, he said one issue in the “en
banc problem” was “whether we have created an intra-circuit conflict of
precedent, or whether judges who disagree with the decision perceive a
conflict when none exists,” adding, “The panel majority believes no
106
conflict exists.”
3. Conflict with the Supreme Court
FRAP 35’s second consideration for en banc rehearing is possible
conflict between a circuit ruling and the Supreme Court. Judges seeking
en banc hearing often claim that a panel has ignored the high court’s
rulings or failed to follow its dictates. A typical claim is that a panel

101. Memorandum from Betty B. Fletcher to Associates (June 12, 1993), N. Star Alaska, 1 F.3d 967.
102. Memorandum from Joseph Sneed to Associates (May 9, 1977), J.R. Simplot Co. v. U.S. Dist.
Ct., Nos. 76-1893, 76-1995, 1976 WL 3826 (9th Cir. Nov. 12, 1976).
103. Memorandum from Beth Levine to Alfred T. Goodwin (Nov. 22, 1982), Desert Palace, Inc. v.
Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 698 F.2d 1229 (9th Cir. 1982) (unpublished table decision).
104. Memorandum from James R. Browning to Associates (July 18, 1974), United States v.
Vielguth, 502 F.2d 1257 (9th Cir. 1974).
105. Id.
106. Memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to Associates (Aug. 21, 1995), Roy v. Gomez, 55 F.3d
1483 (9th Cir. 1995), rev’d en banc, 81 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 1996), vacated sub nom. California v. Roy, 519
U.S. 2 (1996).
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ruling was “inconsistent with the precedents of the Supreme Court.”
Such a direct conflict was claimed when the panel said a district judge
had abused his discretion by declining to allow a defendant to swear his
own oath. Prior to calling for en banc, a judge said, “The majority’s
reading of the First Amendment is . . . at odds with recent Supreme
108
109
Court precedent,” specifically Employment Division v. Smith. In
another case, in asking a panel to call for a party’s response to a
suggestion for rehearing en banc (“SREB”), en banc coordinator Judge
Goodwin said both the panel opinion and the petition made it “appear
that we may be in conflict with Supreme Court cases cited by the
110
government.” And another judge called for en banc hearing because
“the majority opinion cannot be squared with” three Supreme Court
111
opinions. Still another en banc call contained the claim that en banc
rehearing was needed, in part, “to be in accord with Supreme Court
112
precedent.”
A direct statement of conflict came as part of an en banc call in an
attorney’s fee case, in which a judge said, as to a case the Supreme Court
had decided after the panel’s ruling, “The decision is contrary to
113
Kentucky v. Graham.” What followed was disputation between this
judge, who had dissented on the panel, and the panel author, with others
involved, as to whether the Supreme Court had in fact done what the
114
dissenter claimed. And in an antitrust case that was eventually decided
en banc, the judge calling for en banc rehearing said that the panel
decision “deviates substantially from established Supreme Court and
Ninth Circuit antitrust doctrine and seriously erodes the integrity of
115
antitrust law in general,” and a colleague who supported the en banc
call was later to say, with respect to an amended opinion in the case, that
it “continues to apply incorrect premises to . . . antitrust analysis—

107. Memorandum from Alex Kozinski to Associates (Mar. 27, 1973), United States v. VasquezChan, 978 F.2d 546 (9th Cir. 1992).
108. Memorandum from J. Clifford Wallace to active & senior judges (Oct. 16, 1982), United
States v. Ward, 973 F.2d 730 (9th Cir.), amended and superseded by 989 F.2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1992).
109. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
110. Memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to Associates (Sept. 29, 1976), NLRB v. ElectroVector, Inc., 539 F.2d 35 (9th Cir. 1976).
111. Memorandum from Shirley Hufstedler to Associates & senior judges (Oct. 23, 1973), Adams
v. S. Cal. Nat’l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973).
112. Memorandum from Procter Hug, Jr. to Associates (Aug. 7, 1995), Roy, 55 F.3d 1483.
113. Memorandum from John Noonan to Associates (Oct. 27, 1986) (citing Kentucky v. Graham,
473 U.S. 159 (1985)), Sw. Marine, Inc. v. Campbell Indus., 806 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1986), reh’g denied,
811 F.2d 501 (9th Cir. 1987).
114. E.g., Memoranda from Stephen Reinhardt to Associates (Oct. 29, 1986 & Dec. 12, 1986), Sw.
Marine, 806 F.2d 898.
115. Memorandum from William Norris to Associates (Aug. 28, 1987), RC Dick Geothermal
Corp. v. Thermogenics, Inc., 827 F.2d 407 (9th Cir. 1987), aff’d en banc, 890 F.2d 139 (9th Cir. 1989).
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premises that directly conflict with principles enunciated by the Supreme
116
Court.”
A judge may suggest not that the panel has reached a result in
conflict with the Supreme Court but rather that the panel’s ruling was “a
117
fundamental misapplication” of a Supreme Court ruling, for example,
when two judges said the panel had misapplied the Freedom of
118
Information Act as the Supreme Court had recently interpreted it. The
calling judge likewise may dispute a panel’s apparent broadening of a
Supreme Court ruling, for example, in calling a panel opinion “an
unwarranted expansion of Miranda,” coupling this with a claim of
119
conflict with a Supreme Court ruling applying Miranda. In another case
involving an accident caused by a drinking off-duty soldier, a panel
dissenter, while not making a claim of direct conflict with the Supreme
Court, made an en banc call because “the majority incorrectly applied
120
the policy underlying Feres v. United States.” This drew the response
that the panel “recognized that Feres did not control on these facts, but
properly reasoned that the nonintervention rationale of Feres should bar
any attempt to establish the military’s liability other than based on state
121
law as required by the [Federal Torts Claims Act].” If conflict with
Supreme Court decisions was one problem thought to warrant en banc
rehearing, so was failure to address relevant Supreme Court rulings, as
we see when a judge said a colleague’s general disquisition “cannot
compensate for the failure to discuss Stanford v. Texas and Stanley v.
122
Georgia,” or when a judge in another case said the panel’s “opinion
123
does not consider an important Supreme Court case.”

116. Memorandum from J. Clifford Wallace to active & senior judges (Dec. 17, 1988), RC Dick
Geothermal Corp., 827 F.2d 407.
117. Memorandum from Alex Kozinski to Associates (Aug. 31, 1992), United States v. Goland,
897 F.2d 405 (9th Cir. 1990), aff’d, 959 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1992), and reh’g denied, 977 F.2d 1359 (9th
Cir. 1992).
118. Memorandum from Eugene A. Wright & Cynthia Holcomb Hall to Associates (Apr. 1, 1992),
Fed. Labor Relations Auth. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, 958 F.2d 1490 (9th Cir. 1992).
119. Memorandum from J. Clifford Wallace to active & senior judges (Oct. 27, 1992) (citing
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)), Commonwealth of the N. Mariana Islands v. Mendiola, 976
F.2d 475 (9th Cir. 1992). The case noted was Duckworth v. Eagen, 492 U.S. 195 (1989).
120. Memorandum from Harry Pregerson to Associates (Dec. 15, 1985) (citing Feres v. United
States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950)), Louie v. United States, 776 F.2d 219 (9th Cir. 1985).
121. Memorandum from Eugene A. Wright to active circuit judges (Dec. 17, 1985) (citing Feres,
340 U.S. 135), Louie, 776 F.2d 219.
122. Memorandum from William C. Norris to Associates (May 4, 1987) (citing Stanford v. Texas,
379 U.S. 476 (1965); Stanley v. Georgia, 393 U.S. 819 (1968)), United States v. Wiegand, 812 F.2d 1239
(9th Cir. 1987).
123. Memorandum from J. Clifford Wallace to panel, active & senior judges (May 5, 1986),
Christian Science Reading Room Jointly Maintained v. City of S.F., 784 F.2d 1010 (9th Cir.1986),
amended by 792 F.2d 124 (9th Cir. 1986), and reh’g denied, 807 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1986).
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In a different aspect of relations between the Supreme Court and
the courts of appeals, there are also disputes about whether the circuits
should follow the Supreme Court until it changes the law, rather than
altering the law before Supreme Court action, and arguments against
rehearing en banc have been based on the futility of obtaining a change
in the Justices’ position. As to the former, when the case before the
Ninth Circuit panel involves an issue in which the Supreme Court, in a
case from another circuit, has overturned the Ninth Circuit precedent the
panel was otherwise expected to apply, the question is whether, with the
Supreme Court having trumped circuit precedent, the court must sit en
banc to change the circuit’s own law, or whether the panel by itself could
recognize the obvious and make clear the intervening Supreme Court
ruling’s effect on circuit law. That a panel has overruled a prior circuit
ruling does not, said one judge, require en banc hearing if a Supreme
Court ruling has led to the panel’s decision:
The panels of this court have for a long time felt free to state that
decisions of this court have, in substance, been overruled by decisions
of the Supreme Court of the United States. . . . Panels should still feel
free to do it when they are convinced that this is the effect of
124
subsequent Supreme Court decisions.

However, he had doubts whether the overruling was clear and thus
favored rehearing en banc.
We should note that the same question arises when a new statute or
new rules seem to supersede prior circuit precedent: Should the court of
appeals sit en banc to incorporate these new provisions into its precedent
even if a panel’s ruling doing so contravenes prior court rulings? As one
judge observed to his panel colleagues, “Congress . . . , and not the
panel . . . , abolished the common-law rules of evidence in this circuit and
125
an en banc court is not necessary to effectuate Congress’ goal.” Or, as
former Chief Judge Richard Chambers remarked to a panel for which he
was the opinion author, “As I understand it, we do not need en banc
when the change is dictated by an official amendment of the rules or by
126
an intervening statute.”
4. “Exceptional Importance”
One criterion for hearing a case en banc is its “exceptional
importance,” which fits well with FRAP 35’s advice that en banc

124. Memorandum from Ben C. Duniway to Associates & senior judges (Sept. 20, 1982), Garner v.
United States, 501 F.2d 228 (9th Cir. 1972).
125. Memorandum from Herbert Choy to panel (Apr. 19, 1978), United States v. Grajeda, 570
F.2d 872 (9th Cir.), withdrawn per curiam, 587 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1978).
126. Memorandum from Richard Chambers to panel (Nov. 2, 1981), Pettibone v. Cupp, 666 F.2d
333 (9th Cir. 1982).
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rehearing “is not favored and ordinarily will not be ordered.” That
parties to a case think a matter is important for them does not necessarily
mean they see it as of broad importance for the court, as we see when
they file a petition for rehearing (“PFR”) to overturn the result but do
not seek en banc rehearing. Although panel dissenters often vote against
128
rehearing en banc, the fact that panel members occasionally vote to
deny a PFR but support the en banc suggestion is evidence that judges
see a larger issue in a case independent of the result, indicating a belief
that the issue requires the court’s broader consideration.
When a judge states a substantive reason apart from disagreement
with the panel’s result for taking a case en banc, that reason can be
considered an implicit statement of the case’s importance, as when a
judge said an attorney’s fee order “will affect adversely our future
129
consideration of statutory attorney’s fee cases,” or, as another judge
put it, the case would “muddy the law pertaining to the EAJA [Equal
130
Access to Justice Act].” However, in many instances, a judge calling for
en banc begins with words like, “I want to explain why I view this as an
issue of exceptional importance worthy of en banc review.” For example,
a judge began his memo supporting en banc by saying that the case, on
procedures necessary before grand jury information could be shared with
assisting agency investigative personnel, “presents issues of critical
131
importance to the operation of the grand jury system.”
In a case on sentencing for drug transactions, in which the dispute
was over whether there was intracircuit inconsistency, another judge
referred to “this important issue which affects every person convicted
132
and sentenced in this circuit.” Calling for en banc review of a ruling on
an adult-entertainment zoning ordinance, a judge began by saying that
he “believe[d] the case raises two questions of considerable importance”
relating to standards to be used in such cases, and he argued further that
the court’s decision “should contribute to the body of case law on the
133
subject for guidance of other cities and counties in the Ninth Circuit.”
127. Fed. R. App. P. 35(a).
128. That Judge Norris did so in Keith v. Volpe, 833 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1987), was noted by Judge
Goodwin’s law clerk, Mark Gimpel, in flagging a contention made in the petitioner’s PFR. His
undated message to the judge can be found on the face of a memorandum conveying a General Order
5.4(b) notice. See Memorandum from Mary Schroeder to Associates (Oct. 27, 1998).
129. Memorandum from Charles Wiggins to Associates (July 25, 1986), Jensen v. Stangel, 762 F.2d
815 (9th Cir.), appeal after remand, 790 F.2d 721 (9th Cir. 1985), and withdrawn en banc sub nom.
Jensen v. City of San Jose, 806 F.2d 899 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc).
130. Memorandum from Alex Kozinski to Associates (June 26, 1986), Jensen, 762 F.2d 815.
131. Memorandum from J. Clifford Wallace to Associates (Mar. 23, 1977), J.R. Simplot Co. v. U.S.
Dist. Ct., Nos. 76-1893, 76-1995, 1976 WL 3826 (9th Cir. Nov. 12, 1976).
132. Memorandum from Robert Beezer to Associates (May 6, 1989), United States v. FernandezAngulo, 863 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1968).
133. Memorandum from William Norris to Associates (Apr. 19, 1983), Playtime Theatres v. City of
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One could see the same self-evident importance of the case in the
comment by a judge seeking panel rehearing rather than en banc hearing
that “the case is far reaching in its effect, and I believe the Supreme
134
Court ought to take it on its importance alone.” Yet another example is
provided by the case on whether American “names” in Lloyd’s of
London could sue in U.S. courts or had to follow a forum-selection
clause designating British courts. An intercircuit split the panel had
caused received the most attention, but one judge observed, “This is an
important case in the area of commercial law,” adding that “it is
particularly important in this area of international commerce that the
135
rules rest primarily either on treaties or contracts.”
While some judges argue at length for the importance of cases they
wish reheard en banc, at other times they seem to think the importance
obvious, as when, in a case later to reach the Supreme Court, a judge,
noting that the panel had “invalidate[d] a major piece of social reform
legislation,” the Hawaii Land Reform Act, said, “The importance of the
136
case seems self-evident.” In a memorandum seeking comments prior to
calling for en banc hearing on a panel opinion vacating a Federal Trade
Commission order finding an auto deal in violation of repossession and
resale practice rules, a judge said, “This is unquestionably an opinion of
unusual significance” which he thought would have “a . . . seriously
harmful effect upon the ability of all administrative agencies to function
137
properly.” Likewise, one might assume that panel judges seeking en
banc hearing believe a case satisfies the “importance” criterion as when
they thought, for example, in seeking en banc hearing, the outcome was
controlled by a circuit case which “cannot be reconciled with the
138
Sentencing Guidelines.” And sometimes the exceptional importance
argument is implicit, as when a judge argued for retaining a key provision
of the federal child-pornography statute and the protections it provided,
which required striking down a Ninth Circuit case that was in the way
139
and that had led the panel to its result. Likewise implicit but
Tacoma, 694 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1982) (unpublished table decision).
134. Memorandum from Richard Chambers to Associates (Dec. 5, 1977), United States v. Fannon,
556 F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1977), and United States v. Gumerlock, 556 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1978), aff’d on
reh’g en banc, 590 F.2d 794 (9th Cir. 1979).
135. Memorandum from Joseph Sneed to Associates (July 9, 1997), Richards v. Lloyd’s of London,
107 F.3d 1422 (9th Cir. 1997), withdrawn and superseded en banc by 135 F.3d 1289 (9th Cir. 1998).
136. Memorandum from William Norris to Associates (June 1, 1983), Midkiff v. Tom, 702 F.2d 788
(9th Cir. 1983), rev’d sub nom. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
137. Memorandum from Stephen Reinhardt to Associates (Jan. 7, 1982), Ford Motor Co. v. FTC,
673 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1981).
138. Memorandum from panel to Associates (Mar. 2, 1990), United States v. Castro-Cervantes,
911 F.2d 222 (9th Cir.), amended and superseded by 927 F.2d 1079 (9th Cir. 1990).
139. Memoranda from Alex Kozinski to Associates (Apr. 8, 1993 & May 17, 1993), United States
v. X-Citement Video, 982 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir. 1992), rev’d, 513 U.S. 64 (1994).
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nonetheless clear was an en banc call which spoke of broad, “sharp
disagreement” within the court over Rule 11—“clearly a division of
140
thought . . . as to the usefulness and even the meaning” of the rule.
Rather than being assumed or implicit, the “exceptional
importance” basis of an en banc call can be elaborated, as in a case
involving male guards’ searches of female prisoners. The case was said to
raise “significant legal issues” and to be one which “clearly has the
potential for national impact which could have serious adverse effects on
the mental health and well-being of thousands of women prisoners
141
throughout our prison system.” Another judge, who agreed with both
the majority’s inability to distinguish the guard-inmate contact in the
same case from that approved previously and with the panel dissenter’s
position on the inappropriateness of that contact, thought the case
appropriate for en banc hearing because it “might offer a fine
opportunity to revisit our case law in this areas” and was a “fine en banc
case—that is, one where we can truly straighten out our thinking and the
142
law.” In a case on sanctions imposed on a law firm for misleading
statements, a judge supported en banc because “[t]his is an extremely
important area in this day and age for our profession, for the judicial
143
system, and for society.” That he did so although “[a]t this point I take
144
no position on the merits of the controversy” is an indication that
“importance” for en banc purposes could be independent of a judge’s
preferred result.
The “exceptional importance” criterion is, of course, quite
subjective. This is evident in a judge’s statement that this criterion was
one of two key criteria for granting en banc hearing. Commenting on the
failure of an en banc vote, he said, “Unfortunately for the treasury, and
possibly for the caseloads of the district courts, a majority of our judges
did not believe that a rehearing en banc was of exceptional
145
importance.” Judges also have varying thresholds a case must reach to
be “exceptionally important.” For some, unless one or more of the
specific elements of FRAP 35—intra- or intercircuit conflict or conflict

140. Memorandum from John Noonan to Associates (Sept. 1, 1989), Townsend v. Holman Consulting
Corp., 862 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1988) (unpublished table decision), consolidated with 881 F.2d 788 (9th Cir.
1989), vacated on reh’g en banc, 914 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1990), and amended and superseded en banc by
929 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1990).
141. Memorandum from Harry Pregerson to Associates (June 19, 1992), Jordan v. Gardner, 953
F.2d 1137 (9th Cir. 1992), aff’d en banc, 986 F.2d 1521 (9th Cir. 1993).
142. Memorandum from Ferdinand Fernandez to all judges (June 19, 1992), Jordan, 953 F.2d 815.
143. Memorandum from J. Blaine Anderson (Dec. 10, 1986), Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v.
Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986), reh’g denied, 809 F.2d 584 (9th Cir. 1987).
144. Id.
145. Alfred T. Goodwin, Draft opinion dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc (undated),
Henderson v. United States, 734 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1984).
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with the Supreme Court—is present, the case by definition is not
sufficiently important for en banc treatment. Yet other cases are thought
to be of such general importance that they should be reheard regardless
of the absence of conflict. Some think particular types of cases, such as
capital cases, are always considered especially important and thus serious
candidates for en banc hearing. Such a stance, however, was vigorously
protested in one capital case with the comment that “[u]nless this court
adopts a policy that all capital cases are to be heard en banc, there has
146
been no stated reason here.” And most judges calibrate importance on
a case-by-case basis, seen in the comment that “cases of lesser
147
importance have been taken en banc” as well as in a judge’s agreement
with the sentiments of those advocating en banc rehearing but still not
148
thinking the case should be reheard en banc.
Are there matters believed to be clearly not of “exceptional
importance”? In complaining, “We seem to be voting more and more
frequently on en banc calls in which a principal issue is en banc
worthiness,” a judge suggested that if an issue “is unlikely to arise in our
circuit more frequently than every few decades,” it might not merit en
149
banc rehearing. He said the case before him was “clearly devoid of en
banc worthiness” and didn’t “seem to give rise to any issue of overriding
150
importance,” but those statements are, of course, conclusory. When
something very particular underlies the concern of those who would
rehear a case en banc, the response is that the case did not require such
rehearing. Thus, when only a defendant’s proper sentence is at issue, en
151
banc rehearing is not thought necessary. And when a trial judge had
found an original complaint and a supplemental complaint related, thus
allowing consideration of the latter, the panel opinion author, objecting
to the en banc call, said that the rule of civil procedure at issue “has been
with us for fifty years” and argued that “the system ain’t broke,” so “[w]e

146. Memorandum from J. Clifford Wallace to active & senior judges (Mar. 2, 1987), Woratzek v.
Ricketts 808 F.2d 1322 (9th Cir. 1986), withdrawn and superseded by 820 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1987).
147. Memorandum from Joseph Sneed to Associates (Jan. 9, 1980), In re Gustafson, 619 F.2d 1354
(9th Cir. 1980), aff’d, 650 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1981).
148. See, e.g., Memorandum from Joseph Sneed to Associates (Aug. 7, 1978), United States v.
Seawall, 583 F.2d 416 (9th Cir. 1978); see also Memorandum from James R. Browning to Associates
(Apr. 3, 1973), Lau v. Nichols 483 F.2d 791 (9th Cir. 1972) (“I vote against en banc, although as of now
I would be inclined to agree with [District] Judge [Irving] Hill [who dissented on the panel] and Judge
Hufstedler [who called for en banc] on the merits.”), rev’d, 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
149. Memorandum from Stephen Reinhardt to Associates (Dec. 14, 1988), Keith v. Volpe, 833
F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1987).
150. Id.
151. Memorandum from Charles Wiggins to Associates (May 22, 1991), United States v.
Anderson, 895 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1990), vacated en banc and remanded, 942 F.2d 606 (9th Cir. 1991).
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should not convene eleven judges to restructure Rule 15(d) in order to
152
bring about the reassignment of particular litigation.”
153

5. Intercircuit Conflict

An intercircuit conflict created by a panel is not one of FRAP 35’s
separate desiderata for en banc hearing, but it is another reason offered
for en banc rehearing, and the absence of an intercircuit conflict has
likewise been proffered as a basis for not hearing a case en banc. The
version of Rule 35 in effect since December 1, 1998, “has incorporated
intercircuit conflict as an example of a matter that may be of exceptional
154
importance and therefore grounds for rehearing en banc.” For some
judges, intercircuit conflicts are sufficiently important that a case causing
one is “en banc-worthy,” and even the possibility of an intercircuit
155
conflict has been used to argue that the court should go en banc. A
claim of intercircuit conflict is a potent weapon for a judge seeking to
have a case reheard en banc because its presence is an important
156
criterion for the Supreme Court’s selection of cases, making it more
likely the Justices will grant certiorari. If no intercircuit conflict exists but
a panel’s disposition would appear to create one, taking the case en banc
might resolve the matter without creating the conflict, thus reducing the
probability that the Supreme Court would grant review.
The view that intercircuit conflict is sufficiently important for en
banc hearing was earlier embodied in several circuits’ rules indicating
that an intercircuit conflict regarding a rule of national application was a
basis for taking a case en banc. The Ninth Circuit rule “provided for
possible en banc rehearing if the intercircuit conflict substantially
affected a rule of national application in which there is an overriding
157
need for national uniformity.” However, some Ninth Circuit judges,
particularly J. Clifford Wallace, believed strongly that the presence of
intercircuit conflict was reason enough for an en banc rehearing and
sought to mandate it in those circumstances because of the importance of
maintaining national uniformity of law. The court declined to adopt such

152. Id. The problem arose in part because Ninth Circuit Judge Harry Pregerson, who had initially
had the case below as a district judge, had retained it while serving on the court of appeals.
153. Some material used here is drawn from Stephen L. Wasby, Intercircuit Conflicts in the Courts
of Appeals, 63 Mont. L. Rev. 119 (2002), which also includes treatment of dialogue within the court of
appeals concerning intercircuit conflicts.
154. Judith A. McKenna et al., Case Management Procedures in the Federal Courts of
Appeals 22 (2000).
155. Espinoza-Gutierrez v. Smith, 109 F.3d 551, 554 (9th Cir. 1997) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc) (“A direct conflict with another circuit doesn’t yet exist, but one may be
on the horizon.”).
156. See Sup. Ct. R. 10.
157. McKenna et al., supra note 154, at 22 n.12.
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a rule—perhaps because if a case were going to go to the Supreme Court,
the en banc process would add another year—but did for a while have a
rule requiring a panel creating an intercircuit conflict to so notify the
158
court.
Under this regime, when a government petition for rehearing
alleged an intercircuit conflict, Judge Wallace wrote to his colleagues,
“Our General Orders indicate that if the suggestion contains as one of its
grounds the allegation that the opinion initiates a conflict with another
court of appeals, the panel is to advise us,” and therefore, “[i]t is
159
incumbent upon the panel to advise the court of this alleged conflict.”
And when the Supreme Court, in reversing a Ninth Circuit decision,
noted that an intercircuit conflict between the Ninth Circuit and another
court of appeals was implicated in the case although not the basis of the
Supreme Court’s reversal, on remand the Ninth Circuit sat en banc for
160
further consideration of the case. The Ninth Circuit has since added
procedures by which staff attorneys in the court’s Case Management
Unit monitor certain types of cases, including those in which the panel
expressly disagrees with another circuit, and notify the entire court about
161
them. Thus it is unnecessary for a panel to advise colleagues of the
conflict, but Judge Wallace’s point is met.
Among examples of intercircuit conflict offered as a basis for en
banc rehearing was a panel’s call for en banc to overrule a Ninth Circuit
162
case “that is in conflict with our sister circuits.” On an important
Rule 11 question, a judge supporting en banc rehearing said that two

158. For the practice in another circuit, see this note in a Fifth Circuit case: “In accordance with
Court policy, this opinion, being one which initiates a conflict with the rule declared in another circuit,
was circulated before release to the entire Court, and rehearing en banc was voted by a majority of the
non-recused judges in active service.” Riley v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., 196 F.3d 514, 516 n.* (5th
Cir. 1999).
159. Memorandum from J. Clifford Wallace to all judges (Dec. 17, 1992), Soler v. Scott, 942 F.2d
597 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated sub nom. Sivley v. Soler, 506 U.S. 969 (1992). At times, there was
disagreement over the rule, for example, whether it applied when an intercircuit conflict had not been
alleged by litigants.
160. The case is United States v. Jose, where the Justices stated in their per curiam opinion, “We
express no opinion on the merits of the underlying dispute. The matter, indeed, is one that implicates
an intercircuit conflict.” 519 U.S. 54, 56 (1996). On remand, Judge Hall, after noting this language,
wrote, “In light of this intercircuit conflict, we decided sua sponte to consider the merits of this case en
banc,” an instance of stating the reason for an en banc hearing. United States v. Jose, 131 F.3d 1325,
1327 (9th Cir.1997) (en banc). And, on the merits, the Ninth Circuit decided to agree with the ruling of
the court of appeals with which it had earlier disagreed: “Upon reconsideration, we agree with the
Fifth Circuit’s reasoning and holding,” thus overruling earlier Ninth Circuit cases that had relied on
earlier (and later overruled) Fifth Circuit decisions. Id. at 1329.
161. See David R. Thompson, The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Evaluation Committee, 34 U.C.
Davis L. Rev. 365, 373 (2000).
162. Memorandum from panel to Associates (Nov. 12, 1992), United States v. Atkinson, 990 F.2d
501 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc).
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rules the panel had stated, in addition to being “new to this circuit,” were
163
“contrary to and go considerably beyond, authority in other circuits.”
Another judge, challenging a ruling in a pair of U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines cases, said that they “create a split between our circuit and
164
the only other circuit to have decided the issue.” And a judge who had
earlier called for en banc rehearing on the retroactivity of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 complained when again before court was “a holding
contrary to six other circuits,” because “[t]he opinion is more than simply
incorrect; it simultaneously creates an unnecessary inter-circuit split and
165
robs us of the opportunity to resolve case law within the Ninth Circuit.”
Intercircuit conflict claims play out in the court’s actions in a variety
of ways. One example is a case involving Canadian citizens’ appeal from
a ruling upholding a summons for records held by their U.S. bank; the
summons was issued by the IRS at the request of Revenue Canada under
166
the tax treaty. Early in its opinion, the panel majority, which reversed,
noted that the Second Circuit “has suggested that the international
character of treaty requests counsels against judicial intervention” and
noted that the government had urged the court to adopt the Second
167
Circuit’s position. However, the author distinguished the Second
Circuit case on the grounds that Congress had changed the law after the
168
summons there. Judge Eugene Wright, dissenting, said that the panel
had created an intercircuit conflict by rejecting the Second Circuit
169
position without a “sound basis.” He felt the Second Circuit’s ruling
was not undercut by the subsequent statute, “was consistent with current
law,” and also “shows a healthy respect for the United States’
170
responsibilities under an international treaty.” Not surprisingly, later
discussion within the court of appeals pivoted on the Second Circuit case,

163. Memorandum from Pamela Rymer to all active judges (Oct. 10, 1989), Townsend v. Holman
Consulting Corp., 862 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated on reh’g en banc, 914 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1990),
and amended and superseded en banc by 929 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1990).
164. Memorandum from William Norris to Associates (Oct. 13, 1992), United States v. Sanchez,
967 F.2d 1383 (9th Cir. 1992), and United States v. Harrison-Philpot, 978 F.2d 1520 (9th Cir. 1992)
(earlier opinion withdrawn by 971 F.2d 244 (9th Cir. 1992)).
165. Memorandum from Robert Beezer to Associates (Mar. 8, 1993), Estate of Reynolds v.
Martin, 985 F.2d 470 (9th Cir.), reh’g denied, 994 F.2d 690 (9th Cir. 1993). He also noted that “[e]very
other circuit court to consider the issue has either rejected retroactive application of the 1991 Act, or
follows a previous in-circuit case holding the same.” Id. He was to dissent from denial of en banc
rehearing joined by three other judges. Estate of Reynolds v. Martin, 994 F.2d 690 (9th Cir. 1993).
166. Stuart v. United States, 813 F.2d 243, 245 (9th Cir. 1987).
167. Id. at 247.
168. Id. at 249–50.
169. Id. at 253 (Wright, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 253.
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and Judge Wright’s dissent became the basis for others’ support for
171
rehearing en banc.
Intercircuit conflicts also played a role in post-panel activity
potentially leading to en banc rehearing in a case involving the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act (“IGRA”). The panel, while disagreeing with
the Second Circuit’s use of legislative history, agreed with its result and
thus did not see an intercircuit conflict, as the Second Circuit’s opinion
dealt only with a “judicial gloss” on a case with international
ramifications, while in the present case Congress had imposed “a
mandate of the legislature” which courts were not free to ignore and
172
which the Second Circuit had not had to confront. However, four
judges who dissented from the denial of rehearing en banc thought the
panel had decided the issue at hand “incorrectly, in a manner that
conflicts with the Second Circuit’s interpretation of the same statutory
language,” which was “a conclusion precisely opposite” that by the Ninth
Circuit panel. Acknowledging that the Second Circuit’s “approach is
supported by the Eighth Circuit,” they thought the Second Circuit had
173
“much the better overview of IGRA.”
In a dispute over treatment of a religious display, a judge, arguing
that the Ninth Circuit panel had created an intercircuit split, referred to
174
an Eleventh Circuit case. A few days later the judge wrote that the
Eleventh Circuit had taken its panel ruling en banc, which “attests to the
importance of rehearing Kreisner as a full court,” and she pointed out as
well that two other circuits “have addressed this precise question and
175
have reached the opposite conclusion as the Kreisner majority.” Then,
in the middle of the debate over whether to rehear the case en banc, the
176
Supreme Court handed down Lamb’s Chapelm, which the dissenter
177
believed, “if anything, reinforces my dissent,” but the panel majority
judges asserted it “resolves the inter-circuit conflict that long preceded
it” and further contradicted the claim that the panel had created a circuit
178
split.

171. A law clerk indicated agreement with Judge Wright: “The majority attempts, vainly, to
distinguish this case from a 2nd Cir. Case coming down the other way. We’re creating an intercircuit
conflict for no good reason.” Memorandum from Miriam Reed, Law Clerk, to Alfred T. Goodwin
(May 19, 1987), Stuart, 813 F.2d 243.
172. Rumsey Indian Rancheria of Wintun Indians v. Wilson, 64 F.3d 1250, 1252–53 (9th Cir. 1994).
173. Id. at 1252–53, 1253 n.1 (Canby, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
174. Memorandum from Dorothy W. Nelson to Associates (June 11, 1993) (memorandum not in
file), Kreisner v. San Diego, 988 F.2d 883 (9th Cir. 1993).
175. Memorandum from Dorothy W. Nelson to Associates (June 15, 1993), Kreisner, 988 F.2d 883.
176. Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
177. Memorandum from Robert Boochever to Associates (June 15, 1993), Kreisner, 988 F.2d 883.
178. Memorandum from Dorothy W. Nelson & Alex Kozinski to Associates (June 15, 1993),
Kreisner, 988 F.2d 883.
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A panel may defend its ruling as correct despite a claimed circuit
split but more often will suggest that its opinion can be distinguished
from other circuits’ decisions. Another tack is to suggest that “the split
existed before our decision was filed,” with “divided panels and en banc
reconsiderations . . . common”—so that altering the panel’s ruling “will
179
not create national uniformity.” Presence of intercircuit conflict is also
used to argue against rehearing en banc. En banc coordinator Judge
Goodwin
point[ed] out that if there is in fact a conflict among the circuits,
the . . . case would seem to be a good one for solution by the Supreme
Court, and further rumination by this court may not be cost effective,
180
in terms of delay and en banc resources.

Thus, the norm that, in the interest of nationally uniform law,
intercircuit conflicts should not be created by judges wishing to avoid
having their rulings reviewed may create a pragmatic brake on the
creation of such conflicts. Even when an existing intercircuit conflict
removes the pressure of being the court creating a conflict, the court, by
“weighing in” on the issue and lining up on one side of the conflict, may
increase the likelihood that the Justices will perceive that the conflict is
of sufficient importance to warrant granting certiorari.
If many judges wish to avoid intercircuit conflict, the contrary view
of some is that one should not hesitate to create intercircuit conflicts by
taking a case en banc; that is, one should take a case en banc to create a
conflict. One judge said he “always took the view that we should not
hesitate to create splits if we thoughtfully and carefully concluded that
[another] Circuit was wrong,” doing so to “hold the Supreme Court’s
181
toes to the fire,” to force the Justices to deal with an issue. This
argument is that, if a court of appeals creates an intercircuit conflict, the
Supreme Court is more likely to grant certiorari because an en banc
ruling that is part of an intercircuit conflict situation makes the issue even
182
more visible.

179. Memorandum from Betty B. Fletcher to other judges & Associates (Aug. 26, 1992), Fed.
Labor Relations Auth. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, 958 F.2d 1490 (9th Cir. 1992).
180. Memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to active judges (Apr. 21, 1982), United States v.
Brock, 667 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1982). Judges argue against expending resources on an en banc sitting if
the Supreme Court is going to decide an issue regardless of whether the lower court has sat en banc.
See discussion infra.
181. Email from Alfred T. Goodwin to Stephen L. Wasby (July 29, 1999, 13:23 EDT);
Conversation between Alfred T. Goodwin and Stephen L. Wasby (Oct. 10, 1999). He observed that
with the Supreme Court’s relatively light docket, “I was never convinced . . . that we had a public duty
to hold en bancs to lighten their burden.” He added, “[S]ome of our number actually found it
intellectually stimulating to challenge the Supreme Court from time to time,” although, he added, they
“usually were rewarded by a Nine Zip reversal.”
182. H.W. Perry, Deciding to Decide: Agenda Setting in the United States Supreme Court
(1991), the leading treatment of Justices’ consideration of factors used in granting certiorari, fails to
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Thus a judge might seek intercircuit conflicts, perhaps out of the
belief that the correct position was one stated by another court of
appeals. A judge who recognized that “we run the risk that the en banc
panel would agree with the . . . dissents” in the Eighth Circuit and in the
case before the Ninth Circuit, “thereby creating a conflict in the circuits,”
added, “But that is not a sin,” and recounted how in an earlier case,
despite warnings from Judge Wallace, such a conflict had been created—
183
“with the Supreme Court upholding the Ninth Circuit position.” In
another case, that same judge noted that the Ninth Circuit ruling in the
184
Wong U.S. Sentencing Guidelines case “brings the Ninth Circuit into
line with four other circuits, two of which . . . decided the issue en banc”
so that “I cannot as yet claim a conflict in the circuits as a reason for
taking Wong en banc,” but he nonetheless wished to join “a number of
impassioned dissents” in those other cases, as he was “not hesitant to
create an intercircuit conflict” to “provide a vehicle for the Court to
185
address the festering question” at issue. As he put it directly, “Because
of the exceptional importance of this issue, I have no reluctance to put
pressure on the Supreme Court by creating a conflict in the circuits”
because the matter “has ‘percolated’ in the circuits long enough [and] it
186
is time for the Supreme Court to resolve it once and for all.”
Illustrating the position that court of appeals judges have to make
choices concerning intercircuit conflicts, he declared that “the Ninth
Circuit should step up to the plate and take our cuts at playing a
187
leadership role.”
In another case that raised questions about Guidelines sentences, a
judge in the panel’s majority who had become “unsure” because of the
panel dissent and en banc memoranda said he would not take the case en
banc just to bring the circuit “into conformity with other circuits,” but he
thought the Ninth Circuit’s participation in an intercircuit conflict “may
result in a decision by the Supreme Court resolving this difficult
188
question.” Responding, the judge calling for en banc rehearing
disagreed about forcing the Supreme Court’s hand—“I do not think we

discuss whether en banc rulings provide a “signal” used by the Supreme Court, so the discussion here
is speculative.
183. Memorandum from William Norris to Associates (Aug. 12, 1986), United States v. Gwaltney,
790 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1986). The case to which he referred was Paulsen v. Comm’r of Internal
Revenue, 716 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1983), aff’d, 469 U.S. 131 (1985).
184. United States v. Wong, 2 F.3d 927 (9th Cir. 1993).
185. Memorandum from William Norris to Associates (Sept. 24, 1993), Wong, 2 F.3d 927.
186. Id.
187. In a footnote, he added, “While I agree that we should generally be cautious about creating
conflicts in the circuits, we should avoid being overly cautious.” Id.
188. Memorandum from Charles Wiggins to Associates (Aug. 7, 1990), United States v. Anderson,
895 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1990), vacated en banc, 942 F.2d 606 (9th Cir. 1991).

Wasby_63-HLJ-747 (Do Not Delete)

780

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

3/26/2012 5:28 PM

[Vol. 63:747

should compel the Supreme Court to take our case”—and instead wished
the court to rehear the case en banc to join the other circuits, which he
189
believed “are correct on the merits.”
In all of this, one must question whether the intercircuit conflicts to
which judges point are “real” or are (simply) used as a rhetorical device
to gain advantage, as happens in certiorari petitions to get the Supreme
Court’s attention. The claimant may believe that a conflict actually exists
or there may be a colorable argument of a conflict in rulings, but
exaggeration is likely, with the opposing party left to debunk the claim
by showing that cited cases are inapposite or distinguishable. At times
the claim seems to be little more than a mask for dislike of the panel’s
proposed result rather than one made to protect the principle of
uniformity in national law. That many calls for rehearing en banc are
made by judges known to be at one end of the ideological spectrum or
the other gives further credence to the notion that those calls are
something of a cover for result orientation. We see some of this in en
banc rehearing calls by one of the circuit’s more liberal judges. This
judge felt that two U.S. Sentencing Guidelines cases “create a split
between our circuit and the only other circuit to have decided the
190
issue,” and that panel rulings in two Superfund cases concerning legal
fees as part of clean-up costs “create a circuit split” with the Eighth and
Sixth Circuits. In the latter instance, the judge called for en banc “in the
hopes of sparing the Supreme Court some unnecessary work . . . resolving
191
the conflict with the Sixth and Eighth Circuits.” The panel majority
responded that they “were unable to accept the Eighth Circuit’s shallow
analysis of this statutory interpretation problem. Thus, the conflict was
192
unavoidable.”
6. Institutional Reasons
Apart from conflicts and whether the panel “got it wrong,” matters
of institutional concern are injected into consideration of whether the
court should rehear a case en banc. Maintaining a single court may be the
broadest concern. A judge with a reputation for generally resisting en
bancs had “gradually become convinced that if we are to maintain the
institutional integrity of the court as one court and not as a sense of

189. Memorandum from Stephen Reinhardt to Associates (Aug. 8, 1990), Anderson, 895 F.2d 641.
190. Memorandum from William Norris to Associates (Oct. 13, 1992), United States v. Sanchez,
967 F.2d 1383 (9th Cir. 1992), and United States v. Harrison-Philpot, 978 F.2d 1520 (9th Cir. 1992).
191. Memorandum from William Norris to Associates (Mar. 31, 1993), Key Tronic Corp. v. United
States, 984 F.2d 1025 (9th Cir. 1993), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 511 U.S. 809 (1994), and Stanton
Rd. Assocs. v. Lohrey Enters., 984 F.2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1993).
192. Memorandum from Arthur Alarcon to Associates (Apr. 1, 1993), Key Tronic, 984 F.2d 1025,
and Stanton, 984 F.2d 1015.
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separate panels each going its own way . . . , we have to use in bancs
193
more.” That the court was a single entity and not simply individual
judges was repeated more than fifteen years later when a judge calling
for en banc pointed out that one judge whose opinion he was now
challenging had authored the court’s three earlier opinions on the subject
at issue, almost explicitly stating the concern that one judge should not
make the law of the court but that the whole court should speak as an en
194
banc court.
The matter of whether the court acted as a whole or as a series of
separate panels was also raised in connection with the multiplicity of
Selective Service (usually Conscientious Objector (C.O.)) cases the court
heard in the early 1970s, when a judge reminded his colleagues, “This is
supposed to be one court,” with a panel’s decision “a decision by this
court . . . which we are all bound to follow, whether we like it or not” and
complained of “a tendency on the part of this court, in certain types of
cases, to draw distinctions without differences in order to reach a
195
particular result.”
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, who suggested several times at Ninth
Circuit judicial conferences that the Ninth Circuit sit en banc more
frequently, was expressing an institutional view in saying that an en banc
proceeding would provide the Supreme Court with a broader perspective
on a case. This argument was somewhat mirrored, although used against
rehearing en banc in a particular case, by an earlier judge who voted
against en banc because “[t]he outstanding opinions—majority and
196
dissenting—capture the issue capably and at length.” He added that an
en banc “substitute” opinion would “add the prestige of the full court
and . . . some individualized views,” but for him that “does not provide
197
an impelling necessity” for en banc hearing.
A broader perspective could also be provided on an issue that was
the subject of en banc proceedings if the court simultaneously took en
banc more than one case on the same subject. When more than one case
involving the same issue is in play, institutional rules may affect which
case should be the focus of an en banc call—which has precedence,

193. Memorandum from Ben C. Duniway to Associates (July 16, 1973), United States v. Wade,
489 F.2d 258 (9th Cir. 1973).
194. Memorandum from Charles Wiggins to Associates (Aug. 9, 1989), Partington v. Gedan, 880
F.2d 116 (9th Cir. 1989), vacated, 497 U.S. 1020 (1990), remanded to 914 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1990), and
rev’d en banc and vacated in part, 923 F.2d 686 (9th Cir. 1991).
195. Memorandum from Ben C. Duniway to Associates (May 1, 1972), United States v. Cantero,
471 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir. 1972), and United States v. Sigler, 471 F.2d 1191 (9th Cir. 1972). He mentioned
search and seizure as another such area.
196. Memorandum from Oliver M. Koelsch to Associates (Mar. 7, 1973), Lau v. Nichols, 483 F.2d
791 (9th Cir. 1973), rev’d, 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
197. Id.
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whether one is precedential and the other not, and the like. When two
related U.S. Sentencing Guidelines cases were under consideration, it
was suggested that the court wait until the panel that had withdrawn its
opinion concluded its work so that both cases could be taken en banc
because, as one judge put it, “I think an en banc court would benefit
198
from considering two cases in tandem.” And when several judges were
communicating about reconciling cases on the rules on suppression of
evidence, then-Judge Anthony Kennedy suggested that, as “[s]ix active
judges already are involved in exchange of correspondence on these
cases, which present a significant and recurring issue, [i]t would appear to
be the most efficient use of our resources to take the cases en banc as
199
soon as possible.”
A view in tension with the “institutional integrity” argument is that
panels should retain autonomy to decide a case without en banc review
of that decision by those who simply dislike the result; this is related to
the general notion of not en bancing a case simply because one disagrees
with the panel. In a recent statement, a Sixth Circuit judge pointed to “a
tension that occasionally arises on the courts of appeals between two
objectives: (1) deciding cases correctly and (2) delegating to panels of
200
three the authority to decide cases on behalf of the full court.” He went
on to say that it would be “odd to think of the delegation of decision
authority to panel of three as nothing more than an audition” (for en
201
banc rehearing). A Ninth Circuit panel author arguing against an en
banc call made by a panel dissenter said, “Some respect must be
202
accorded to the principle of panel autonomy,” and an off-panel judge,
in voting against en banc, appended to his vote the comment, “I
agree . . . that the policy of panel autonomy is the controlling factor in
203
this particular case.” (The effort to take the case en banc failed.) When
a judge called for en banc to challenge what he thought was the panel’s
overruling of a prior opinion and said, “the opinion deals rather
presumptuously with the opinion of another panel of this court” (which
204
he called “significant and well-reasoned”), the panel author turned the

198. Memorandum from William Norris to Associates (Oct. 29, 1992), United States v. Sanchez,
967 F.2d 1383 (9th Cir. 1992), and United States v. Harrison-Philpot, 978 F.2d 1520 (9th Cir. 1992).
199. Memorandum from Anthony Kennedy to Associates (June 27, 1978), United States v.
Grajeda, 570 F.2d 872 (9th Cir.), withdrawn per curiam, 587 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1978).
200. Mitts v. Bagley, 626 F.3d 366, 366 (6th Cir. 2010) (Sutton, J., concurring in denial of en banc
rehearing).
201. Id. at 370.
202. Memorandum from Herbert Choy to Associates (Oct. 12, 1978), United States v. Deal, 587
F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1978).
203. Memorandum from Anthony Kennedy to Associates (undated), Deal, 587 F.2d 956 (explaining
his vote on rehearing in Deal).
204. Memorandum from Harry Pregerson to Associates (Jan. 13, 1987), Warren v. Bowen, 804
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dispute into one of “whether a panel can choose the grounds on which it
will reach its decision or whether the full court will take up the task of
205
editing the content of panel opinions.”
Institutional concerns are among the “pragmatic reasons” that
former Chief Judge Patricia Wald of the District of Columbia Circuit has
said help explain “why an obviously frustrated judge will not follow the en
206
banc route.” Perhaps the most frequently offered institutionally related
reason is that en bancs require a significant expenditure of judicial
resources, including time to prepare for argument, argument itself, and the
conference following, and preparation and circulation of opinions. One
Ninth Circuit judge said that, as a district judge he had heard that “en
bancs were too cumbersome and time-consuming,” yet he thought them
too important “for us to use ‘management difficulty’ and ‘time consuming’
207
as excuses to minimize the process.” However, judges keep in mind that
granting en banc rehearing is “among the most serious non-merits
determinations an appellate court can make” because it “may have the
effect of vacating a panel opinion that is the product of a substantial
208
expenditure of time and effort by three judges and numerous counsel.”
Judges might believe it not worth the court’s time and energy to
rehear a case because of the required additional in-chambers work
necessary to decide the case and the possible disruption of calendars
caused by having to bring together judges who live scattered throughout
the circuit, although en banc courts can be held when the judges gather
209
for their periodic administrative court meetings. Arguing against en
banc rehearing—in a case that ultimately did go to the Supreme Court—
the panel author spoke of the length of time that en banc consideration
of the serious issues would consume, beyond the extended time
(seventeen months) the panel had devoted to it. Writing on June 3, 1983,
he noted that two cases, argued en banc on December 18, 1981, and June
15, 1982, “are still with us” and that the case before him had “issues no
210
easier of solution or less provocative.” One can add the argument that

F.2d 1120 (9th Cir. 1986), amended on denial of reh’g by 817 F.2d 63 (9th Cir. 1987).
205. Memorandum from Alex Kozinski to Associates (Jan. 22, 1987), Warren, 804 F.2d 1120.
206. Patricia Wald, Changing Course: The Use of Precedent in the District of Columbia Circuit,
34 Clev. St. L. Rev. 477, 482 (1986) (quoted by Hellman, supra note 84, at 1049).
207. Memorandum from J. Blaine Anderson to Associates (May 22, 1978), United States v. Cook,
608 F.2d 1175 (9th Cir. 1977).
208. Bartlett ex rel. Newman v. Bowen, 824 F.2d 1240, 1242 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (per curiam)
(Edwards, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc, in a situation in which court majority revoked
its previous grant of en banc rehearing).
209. The Ninth Circuit has resisted allowing judge participation in en banc hearings by
videoconferencing.
210. Memorandum from Arthur Alarcon to Associates (June 3, 1983), Midkiff v. Tom, 702 F.2d
788 (9th Cir. 1983), rev’d sub nom. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
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the court has too many en banc cases, thus affecting its work, particularly
its judges’ ability to keep up with panel opinions. As one judge put it in
the case just discussed, “I would not put this on our en banc plate unless
and until we have licked that plate cleaner than previously appears to be
211
the case.”
Judge Douglas Ginsburg of the District of Columbia Circuit has
noted that even panelists who also serve on the en banc court “may need
substantially to repeat their preparation” because of the lapse of time
since initial panel consideration, and “they may have to start almost from
scratch if the parties have submitted new briefs for the rehearing,”
particularly if the en banc court is to consider matters not before the
212
panel. Moreover, although the author of the en banc court’s opinion
may be able to draw on the prior panel ruling or on the opinion of the
panel dissenter, even more time may be consumed in en banc opinion
preparation because the draft disposition must be circulated to more
judges, each of whom may wish to communicate, so that “[a]t each step
the opinion writer must accommodate multiple, sometimes conflicting,
213
suggestions.”
While not directly in opposition to en banc hearing, but fitting
comfortably with the notion that rehearing en banc should be avoided
because of its burden on resources, is the suggestion that a panel could
make changes in precedent without en banc rehearing. Yet in courts that
do not utilize pre-filing circulation of opinions to the whole court or
214
informal en banc procedures, attempting to avoid en banc rehearing in
this fashion can produce strong reaction. When a panel wanted to
overrule a precedent on the basis that circuit precedent “has been made
215
obsolete” by the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, there was
debate within the court on whether to use a shortcut procedure. One
216
objecting judge called it “short-change” rather than a “short-cut.” The
suggestion was then made that if no one asked for en banc, a footnote be
included stating, “To the extent this opinion expresses views inconsistent
with” an earlier ruling, and also stating that “it should be noted that this

211. Memorandum from Joseph Sneed to Associates (Oct. 16, 1978), United States v. Deal, 587
F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1978).
212. Douglas H. Ginsburg & Donald Falk, The Court En Banc: 1981–1990, 59 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
1008, 1018–19 (1991).
213. Id. at 1019.
214. See Michael Kanne, The “Non-Banc En Banc”: Seventh Circuit Rule 40(e) and the Law of the
Circuit, 32 S. Ill. U. L.J. 611, 618 (2008). The D.C. Circuit appends a footnote (the “Irons footnote”)
indicating use of its procedure of circulating within the entire court to resolve conflicts. See Irons v.
Diamond, 670 F.2d 265, 268 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1981); see also Ginsburg & Falk, supra note 212, at 1015.
215. Memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to panel (Sept. 28, 1977), United States v. Cook, 608
F.2d 1175 (9th Cir. 1977).
216. Memorandum from J. Blaine Anderson to Associates (May 22, 1978), Cook, 608 F.2d 1175.
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opinion has been circulated to all the judges of this court, no judge has
called for en banc consideration” so that “accordingly, this opinion may
217
be considered to be the preferred view of the court.” This set off a
further outcry, initially from some senior judges, with one saying that when
the question was “Which is the better rule? . . . That judgment . . . should
218
be [made] by the court en banc.”
Some institutional aspects of the decision whether to hear a case en
banc may have been different in the Ninth Circuit when the court had
only eleven and then thirteen judges rather than its present twenty-eight
because matters could be handled more informally. Thus when a judge
who had sought en banc rehearing over a particular issue found he had to
recuse, the suggestion was made that another case on that issue be found
so that the judge could “participate directly in the consideration and
219
decision of the issue he wishes to raise.” Earlier in the same case, one
saw that the smaller court also appeared to operate on the basis that if a
panel asked for en banc, such rehearing should be automatic. As one
judge put it, “Since the panel wants this case taken en banc, there is
220
really no alternative.”
There are also external institutional concerns about the larger
judicial system beyond the court of appeals itself. There are disputes over
the extent of the effect of a ruling, with those seeking en banc
emphasizing the extent of the effect, while the panel might attempt to
minimize the number of other cases to be affected. There is also the
stated need to provide guidance for the district courts whose judges
would have to apply court of appeals rulings. Some judges, particularly
those with prior (state or federal) trial court experience, would express
concern about the difficulties a panel’s ruling would create for the district
courts. Thus in supporting en banc hearing, one judge who had state trial
court experience said in a case on waiver of counsel, “The opinion as
written puts an unfair and unreasonable burden on trial court judges,”
221
and “The district judges are entitled to more guidance.” This concern
about the law to be applied by district judges was also evident in the
statement that “we share a collegial responsibility with the judges of the

217. Memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to all active judges (Apr. 28, 1978), Cook, 608 F.2d 1175.
218. Memorandum from Charles Merrill to Associates (Apr. 27, 1978), Cook, 608 F.2d 1175.
219. Memorandum from James R. Browning to Associates (July 19, 1974), Deere & Co. v. Sperry
Rand Corp., 513 F.2d 1131 (9th Cir. 1975) (per curiam). The recused judge suggested that another
judge be drawn to replace him on the panel, which would continue with the case, and that suggestion
was adopted.
220. Memorandum from James R. Browning to Associates (Feb. 26, 1974), Deere, 513 F.2d 1131.
221. Memorandum from Eugene A. Wright to Alfred T. Goodwin (Apr. 26, 1973), United States v.
Price, 474 F.2d 1223 (9th Cir.), reh’g denied, 484 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1973).
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district court, without whose cooperation we could not get any work
222
done.”
7. Other Reasons Not to Go En Banc
Attempts to modify panel opinions are at times efforts to avoid en
bancs. When judges suggest ways of resolving their concerns, the
implication is sometimes that if matters are not resolved, an en banc call
will follow. Or a judge who has called for en banc might suggest that if
the panel would add a few words to its opinion, the case could be
reconciled with another case with which it was said to conflict, thus
223
obviating the need for en banc hearing. As one judge put it, “It does
seem to me that we should be able to reconcile the . . . opinions without
224
an en banc hearing.” Explaining his request for a delay in the
proceedings, a judge said that “[t]he only reason” for his request “was to
give the panel an opportunity . . . to modify the opinion in such a manner
225
as might spare us the necessity for another en banc hearing.” Another
way of resolving a case short of taking it en banc, and offered as a reason
against en banc hearing, would be that the panel would grant panel
rehearing to deal with the issues posed.
Efforts to resolve disagreement short of an en banc do not always
succeed. In one such instance, upon receiving what he called an
“overwhelmingly persuasive” memo (by Judge Charles Wiggins)
supporting an en banc call, a judge wrote, “I strongly recommend that
the panel retreat and save all of us the burdens of en banc
226
consideration.” The panel did not retreat, with the panel majority
“believ[ing] that we decided the attorney’s fee question correctly,” so it
was “not moved by Judge Wiggins’ suggestion that we disregarded
227
precedent.” The panel then explained why the issue was one of first
228
impression, not previously decided in the circuit or the Supreme Court.
There are other reasons why judges, even if displeased with
particular panel outcomes, do not vote to rehear such cases en banc. It is

222. Memorandum from John Noonan to Associates (Sept. 1, 1989), Townsend v. Holman
Consulting Corp., 862 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated on reh’g en banc, 914 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1990),
and amended and superseded en banc by 929 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1990).
223. One such case was United States v. Giese, which did proceed to an en banc vote, which failed.
569 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1978), amended and reh’g denied, 597 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 1979).
224. Memorandum from Walter Ely to panel & Associates (May 2, 1978), United States v.
Grajeda, 570 F.2d 872 (9th Cir.), withdrawn per curiam, 587 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1978).
225. Memorandum from Walter Ely to Associates & James Carter (June 1, 1976), United States v.
Pacheco-Ruiz, 549 F.2d 1204 (9th Cir. 1976).
226. Memorandum from J. Blaine Anderson to Associates (June 25, 1986), Jensen v. City of San
Jose, 806 F.2d 899 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc).
227. Memorandum from Harry Pregerson to Associates (July 3, 1986), Jensen, 806 F.2d 899.
228. Id.
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possible that the court would do all the work associated with an en banc
rehearing only to come out the same way as the panel or that the process
“may yield a decision that . . . has little implication beyond the facts of
229
the case being reheard.” This is related to the objection that hearing
the case en banc wouldn’t matter. In a case on the “exculpatory ‘no’”
defense, a judge said that even if an en banc court would rewrite the law
on the subject, the defendant “could not have successfully invoked
the . . . defense in any event,” and he reminded his colleagues that former
Chief Judge Chambers “used to warn us about taking off without a pay
230
load.” Another judge similarly opined that “En Banc would not settle
231
the problem,” calling the matter “a job for Super Court.”
At other times, en banc consideration of a particular case is thought
to be premature, or the issue may already be under consideration in a
case that has proceeded further and could provide the opportunity for en
banc if there is interest. Similarly, if the Supreme Court has already
granted certiorari in another circuit’s case posing the issue, proceeding
232
with an en banc court would not make sense. More generally, action in
another case—one either in the en banc process or in which en banc
rehearing is being considered—might be likely to resolve concerns that
either a party or an off-panel judge has raised. On the other hand, that
the court had the opportunity to take a case raising an issue en banc but
had not done so might be used to argue against doing so now; in short, if
the court had already considered whether a case was worthy of en banc
treatment and had decided in the negative, it need not repeat the
discussion. Likewise, it could be argued that en banc was not necessary
when a case like the one being challenged had been taken to the
233
Supreme Court and the Justices had denied certiorari.
Another situation in which en banc was said not to be appropriate
was the revision of an opinion in light of a Supreme Court ruling that had
come down while the panel was awaiting a Ninth Circuit en banc ruling
in another case. While the panel dissenter called for en banc after a
several-paragraph order commenting on how the case then stood, with
the author conceding that the opinion was not “untidy,” a judge (also the
en banc coordinator) argued against en banc and urged the panel

229. Ginsburg & Falk, supra note 212, at 1020.
230. Memorandum from J. Clifford Wallace to active & senior judges (Nov. 19, 1987), United
States v. Olsowy, 819 F.2d 930 (9th Cir.), superseded by 836 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1987).
231. Post-it note from Alfred T. Goodwin on law clerk memorandum (Nov. 27, 1989), Franklin v.
Kaypro Corp., 884 F.2d 1222 (9th Cir. 1989).
232. Memorandum from Beth Levine, Motions Attorney, to Alfred T. Goodwin (June 16, 1982),
New Jersey v. United States, 706 F.2d 1533 (9th Cir. 1983).
233. Memorandum from Beth Levine, Motions Attorney, to Alfred T. Goodwin (Apr. 28, 1982),
Int’l Ass’n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. Boeing Co., 694 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1982)
(unpublished table decision).
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majority “to strike out the obviously unnecessary and dissonant
234
language.” He said that “[r]ewriting a butchered opinion to clean up
after an intervening Supreme Court decision is not good en banc
235
business,” and the case was returned to the panel to be amended.
Still another type of response to an en banc request is that the
calling judge’s concerns should be addressed not in the courts but outside
them. This objection was raised in the school desegregation case
concerning Chinese-speaking elementary school children in San
Francisco who were made to attend classes taught only in English.
Responding to the en banc call—by Judge Shirley Hufstedler, later
Secretary of Education—that raised equal protection issues, another
judge said he was “in complete agreement that this is a worthy cause”
but he could not agree “that it is grist for the judicial mill or that it would
be wise to stretch the equal protection clause so as to activate the
236
courts.” In another instance, concerning court sanctions for filing
frivolous documents on appeal, it was argued that the matter raised by
the case should be resolved elsewhere, but within the court system. A
judge sought en banc because the panel had improperly applied Rule 11,
intended for the district courts, to the court of appeals, but he said that
this was a matter to be incorporated in the court’s local rules, which were
237
considered by the circuit’s Advisory Committee on Rules. The judge
urged that the case be taken en banc to overrule prior cases and that “we
then refer the issue of sanctions for misconduct occurring before our
238
court to the local Advisory Committee.”
Whatever substantive reasons judges offer for or against rehearing
en banc, they may also engage in strategic thinking, trying to consider the
likely outcome of en banc hearing. For example, a judge on a panel
dealing with whether shoplifting impugned a witness’s veracity was
“uncertain whether on an en banc roll call this would be the court’s
239
position.” A panel, in determining whether or not to initiate en banc
activity, realized that an en banc call was not likely to succeed and
decided not to move forward with a call. Judge Goodwin, in a memo to
his file, said that Senior Judge John Kilkenny, the panel dissenter in a

234. Memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to Associates (Feb. 24, 1977), Davis v. Cnty. of L.A.,
Nos. 73-3008, 73-3009, 1976 WL 3779 (9th Cir. Oct. 20, 1976), withdrawn and superseded by 566 F.2d
1344 (9th Cir. 1977), vacated sub nom. Cnty. of L.A. v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625 (1978).
235. Id.
236. Memorandum from Charles Merrill to Associates (Feb. 23, 1973), Lau v. Nichols, 483 F.2d
791 (9th Cir. 1972), rev’d, 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
237. Memorandum from Charles Wiggins to Associates (Sept. 29, 1989), Partington v. Gedan, 880
F.2d 116 (9th Cir. 1989).
238. Id.
239. Memorandum from Ozell Trask to panels (Nov. 22, 1977), United States v. Cook, 608 F.2d
1175 (9th Cir. 1979).
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case on governmental officer immunity, and he agreed with another
judge that the Supreme Court was likely to take the issue, but added, “I
did not call for a vote on taking the case en banc because I was
reasonably certain that we wouldn’t be able to get seven votes” (the
240
majority at the time). In a different case with another senior judge,
Judge Goodwin agreed that “the hostility of some of our judges to
Rule 11, in combination with a tendency of some of our judges to apply
Rule 11 expansively, is creating intracircuit conflict and confusion for
district judges,” but he was unsure whether the intracircuit conflict the
panel dissenter had noted “is clear enough to pick up 14 votes for an en
241
banc,” the majority necessary in the now-larger court.
II. En Banc or Supreme Court
Whether to rehear a case en banc or instead to forego rehearing so
the case can go directly to the Supreme Court is a matter about which
judges argue. The matter likely does not arise in most cases, but some
judges use the argument that en banc rehearing should be declined
because the Supreme Court will have to—or is likely to—resolve the
issue or case before them. Judges make comments to the effect that if the
Supreme Court believed the Ninth Circuit had relied on a case
mistakenly or wished to disavow that case, the Court would be likely to
take the case, and thus rehearing the case en banc would simply delay the
filing of a certiorari petition by the losing party. Such arguments are, of
course, disputed by those seeking en banc treatment, although
sometimes it is simply argued that some action be taken, promptly, to
resolve a case, whether it be en banc rehearing or “letting the case go.”
For example, a panel dissenter argued that, rather than take more time
revising an opinion, which would require a revision of the dissent,
“everyone would be better if this case were either taken en banc
immediately or sent on its way to the Supreme Court where it is likely to
242
end up in any event.”
A. Increasing the Number of En Bancs
If courts of appeals followed the suggestion made by Justice
O’Connor and others that they sit en banc more often in matters likely to

240. Memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to file (undated), Imbler v. Pachtman, 500 F.2d 1301
(9th Cir. 1974), aff’d, 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
241. Memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to Joseph Sneed (Aug. 29, 1989), Townsend v.
Holman Consulting Corp., 862 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated on reh’g en banc, 914 F.2d 1136 (9th
Cir. 1990), and amended and superseded en banc by 929 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1990).
242. Memorandum from Joseph Sneed to Associates (Apr. 11, 1988), Duro v. Reina, 821 F.2d 1358
(9th Cir.), superseded by 851 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1987), rev’d, 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
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243

reach the Supreme Court, circuit precedent might move closer to the
Supreme Court’s views, making further review unnecessary. This
rationale can be seen when Ninth Circuit judges argue that a case should
be heard en banc for reasons of practicality because the Supreme Court
would be saved the time of announcing the likely outcome. An en banc
decision would also provide assurance that the appeals court’s doctrinal
rule was approved by its majority or at least that more than the three
panel members (with the panel likely to include a senior judge, district
judge, or a judge visiting from another circuit) had participated in
developing it. In advocating en banc rehearing, a judge said that he was
“distressed that a panel, with only one active judge participating, would
244
now reject [the court’s previous] standard for effectiveness of counsel.”
Because en banc courts are often divided, their opinions might also
present the Justices with a range of interpretations wider than those from
a three-judge panel. It would make sense for the courts of appeals to sit
en banc if the Supreme Court were to turn away most en banc
dispositions or to affirm many of those it did review. However, an en
banc disposition calls greater attention to a case, providing a cue or
245
signal for the Justices, thus making the grant of review more likely.
Do court of appeals judges agree with the Justices about sitting en
banc more often? If en banc rehearing is supposed to be an institutional
means to relieve pressure on the Supreme Court but appears not to
benefit the lower court, why go en banc? Sometimes judges think the
court should do so. In one case, the government’s suggestion for en banc
rehearing, filed with the Solicitor General’s approval, had contained a
claim that the case was decided on the luck of the (panel) draw. Said a
judge, who was not usually disposed to en banc hearings, “I would hate
to see Deep taken to the Supreme Court on cert. on that ground. We
ought to straighten it out ourselves,” because otherwise, he suggested,
the Supreme Court might develop a new ground for granting certiorari—

243. See supra notes 196–97 and accompanying text.
244. Memorandum from J. Clifford Wallace to Associates (May 4, 1977), Cooper v. Fitzharris, 551
F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1977), aff’d on reh’g en banc, 586 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1978).
245. Hellman reports that from 1991 to 1998, certiorari was sought from half of the Ninth Circuit’s
en banc rulings, with ten of forty-eight petitions being granted. Hellman, supra note 40, at 441.
Certiorari was sought in three-fifths of the cases where a call for en banc rehearing did not succeed,
with the ratio of grants only one in seven. Id. at 445. In the sixty cases in which an off-panel judge
circulated a memo about the case but no en banc vote resulted, certiorari was granted in only six. Id. A
study of three circuits makes clear that certiorari petitions were filed in a much higher portion of en
banc rulings in all court of appeals cases, and also found that the court of appeals having sat on en
banc was one factor significantly related statistically to the grant of certiorari. See Tracey E. George &
Michael E. Solimine, Supreme Court Monitoring of the United States Courts of Appeals En Banc,
9 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 171, 185 tbl.1, 195–96 (2001). A study by the Author demonstrated that, among
cases in which review was granted, en banc rulings were more likely to be reversed than were panel
rulings. See Wasby, The Supreme Court, supra note 5, at 66.
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246

intracircuit conflict. Although Judge Goodwin ordinarily preferred to
let cases go to the Supreme Court without en banc hearing, in an
immigration case he felt otherwise. As a member of the panel, he had
dissented, saying the case was controlled by a Supreme Court ruling that
247
had reversed one of his earlier rulings. After another judge called for
en banc, Judge Goodwin said, “Ordinarily I would be willing to let the
Supreme Court reverse as in some of our other immigration cases when
we didn’t follow Supreme Court precedent,” but here he thought instead
that “we should do some of our own housekeeping and not force the
Supreme Court to maintaining consistency of decisions within the
248
Circuit.”
However, en banc was often not Judge Goodwin’s preference when
the alternative was to let the case go to the Justices. “I was never
convinced,” he said, “that a court taking 80 cases a year was so
overworked that we had a public duty to hold en bancs to lighten their
249
burden.” Given courts of appeals’ important institutional concern of
bringing cases to conclusion, an en banc hearing delays the arrival at the
Supreme Court of a case likely to reach there in any event. The Ninth
Circuit’s longtime en banc coordinator has said that
losing an en banc request can be the best thing for litigants in some
cases. “If we take a case en banc, it will spend another year in our
court. . . . If it is clear the case will end up before the Supreme Court
sooner or later, it may save judicial resources to deny the rehearing en
250
banc and let the parties seek cert at the Supreme Court immediately.”

And at another time, he said, “To go en banc is to create a one-year
delay in the case for the parties and burns up judicial resources,” to
which he added, “If the Supreme Court is going to take it, let’s let them
251
get at it,” as en banc would “delay for another year,” during which time
252
the parties could not obtain relief. This view is reinforced by the
comment by a Fourth Circuit judge, who said that after a panel’s
decision, “some further not insignificant amount of time [two to three
months] will pass before the case is actually argued before the en banc
court,” with more time (and more time than in preparation of panel
253
opinions) elapsing while opinions are prepared.

246. Memorandum from Ben C. Duniway to Richard Chambers (June 27, 1973), United States v.
Deep, 497 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1974).
247. INS v. Wang, 622 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1980), rev’d, 450 U.S. 139 (1981).
248. Memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to all active judges (Apr. 16, 1986), Saldana v. INS,
762 F.2d 824 (9th Cir. 1985).
249. Steve Albert, The Ninth Circuit’s Secret Ballot, Recorder (S.F.), Mar. 3, 1995, at 1.
250. Id. at 10 (quoting Alfred T. Goodwin).
251. Interview with Alfred T. Goodwin in Sisters, Or. (Oct. 11, 1999).
252. Interview with Alfred T. Goodwin in Pasadena, Cal. (Jan. 25, 2000).
253. “There is . . . every reason to believe that it might take longer given the statistically greater
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The Supreme Court’s taking a case or the likelihood it would do so
reinforces the argument of those willing to leave the matter to the Court,
who would forego en banc so the Justices could rule. In a note to himself,
a judge said, “I guess if the case is wrong, the Supremes will take it,” and
later he told his colleagues, “I plan no further activity in this case, and
254
will leave it to the Supreme Court to decide whether we have erred.” In
a somewhat more complex situation, the Justices had granted certiorari,
vacated, and remanded (“GVR”) a case. The panel dissenter, who at first
called for en banc because “The majority . . . has treated the Supreme
Court’s order as something to be endured rather than treated
255
seriously,” later withdrew the call because he had begun to be “a little
bit disturbed over the increase in calls for en banc” and, most relevant
here, because if he were correct in his view of the case, “the Supreme
Court will probably take care of the force of its remand order without
256
any en banc by us.” Commenting on the Supreme Court order, a
Goodwin law clerk said, “If the majority is incorrect, I’d let the S.C. tell
them. [Engle v.] Isaac is so fuzzy that I’d prefer to let that Court explain
its parameters,” while another observed, “This is what happens when the
257
Supremes waffle and refuse to hand down a clear rule of law.”
Some judges have gone further, hoping the Justices would take up
the matter. Chief Judge Chambers had said earlier that the issues in a
case “cannot be long delayed in resolution by the Supreme Court,”
258
which—not the Ninth Circuit—was the ultimate authority. A later
judge said he hoped “the Apprendi zoo” would be taken by the Supreme
Court to help resolve whether a judge rather than a jury could increase a
259
penalty above the statutory maximum. Wanting a prompt answer, he
said “we should not delay the inevitable word from the infallibles by
260
reviewing [the case] en banc even if we might believe it is wrong.” As

likelihood of multiple writings . . . .” Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 211 F.3d 853, 860
(4th Cir. 2000) (Luttig, J., dissenting from denial of hearing en banc).
254. Note on memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin (Sept. 29, 1976), NLRB v. Electro-Vector,
Inc., 539 F.2d 35 (9th Cir. 1976).
255. Memorandum from Cecil Poole to Associates (June 7, 1983), Myers v. Washington, 702 F.2d
766 (9th Cir. 1983). The earlier Ninth Circuit opinion in this case, Myers v. Washington, 646 F.2d 355
(9th Cir. 1981), was vacated and remanded by Washington v. Myers, 456 U.S. 921 (1982).
256. Memorandum from Cecil Poole to Associates (June 22, 1983), Myers, 646 F.2d 355.
257. Post-it note attached to General Order 5.4(b) Notice (citing Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107
(1982)), Myers, 646 F.2d 355.
258. United States v. Price, 484 F.2d 485, 487 (9th Cir. 1973) (Chambers, C.J., concurring in denial
of rehearing en banc). He added: “But about every other Monday we get proof that we are not the
ultimate authority.” Id.
259. Memorandum from Stephen Trott to Associates (Aug. 22, 2001) (citing Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000)), United States v. Buckland, 259 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2001), rev’d en banc,
277 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2002).
260. Id.
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“[t]he circuits are split,” he added, if the Ninth Circuit let the case
261
become final, “the Court will have to act.” Countering, another judge
said, “The problem . . . with the ‘straight to the High Court’ approach is
262
that it leaves the question open for a long period.” Another judge’s
“hesitancy in joining in suggesting that we en banc” a case, he said, “rests
on my hope that the Supreme Court grants certiorari,” with the petition
263
already having been filed. The author of an opinion, responding to
another judge’s serious questioning of the opinion, said the panel
“hope[d] the Supreme Court will take the case and narrow it down as
much or as little as it sees fit” and that “[i]f the language of the opinion
was too broad (too quick and dirty), the Supreme Court knows how to
264
water it down.”
In other instances, judges went further still to opine that the Justices
would grant review. In one case, Chief Judge Chambers, saying there was
a good chance the Supreme Court would take a case, disagreed with his
colleagues that there was a higher likelihood of the case going to the
265
Supreme Court if the Ninth Circuit heard it en banc. In yet another
266
case, on use of the Allen (or “dynamite”) charge, a judge stated, “With
all of the furor over this subject and considering the Circuit conflicts, it is
quite likely that the Supreme Court would accept certiorari and
undertake a reexamination,” although he also realized that “this is
267
somewhat risky and others may have a better feel for it.” Another case
provides further illustration of the argument that en banc rehearing
delays arrival of a case at the Supreme Court, although it is an instance in
which a conservative judge may well have been seeking a conservative
result. The judge said the court should consider whether it was wise to
delay possible Supreme Court review by taking the case en banc: “This
appears to me a case that the Supreme Court will want to take a look at.
To me, it has all the earmarks of a case in which certiorari will be granted.
268
By en bancing, we merely delay final review.” Another judge, favoring

261. Id.
262. Memorandum from Michael Daly Hawkins to Associates (Aug. 22, 2001), Buckland, 259 F.3d
1157. He added, “I recognize that ‘the fault is not in ourselves, but in our Supremes!’” Id.
263. Memorandum from Joseph Sneed to Associates (Jan. 26, 1979), Walker v. Loggins, 608 F.2d
731 (9th Cir. 1979).
264. Memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to Associates (Jan. 11, 1982), Ford Motor Co. v. Fed.
Trade Comm’n, 673 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1981).
265. Vote explanation by Richard Chambers (Mar. 4, 1976), United States v. Portillo-Reyes, 529
F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1975). “I do not,” he said, “belong to the school that believes there is a better chance
to get the case into the Supreme Court because we took it en banc.” Id.
266. See Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896).
267. Memorandum from J. Blaine Anderson to Associates (Aug. 3, 1978), United States v.
Seawell, 583 F.2d 416 (9th Cir. 1978).
268. Memorandum from Eugene A. Wright to Associates (Dec. 8, 1977), United States v. Fannon,
556 F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1977), and United States v. Gumerlock, 556 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1978), aff’d on
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en banc and thus wanting the same outcome as the first judge, said that
relying on a grant of certiorari was a “rather risky” course and called
attention to Supreme Court rulings “where the circuit conflict has gone on
269
for years before they finally decide to take a case and resolve it.”
Yet debate also occurs about whether the Supreme Court would
grant review. When a judge asserted, “It seems likely that the Supreme
Court will grant certiorari in one or more of the cases” on the question
270
before the court, another judge argued to the contrary, finding “no
271
guarantee” that the Supreme Court would resolve the pending issue.
Beyond that, said the latter judge, even were cert granted, “this should
not prevent us from giving this issue the type of consideration that it
272
deserves and that the other circuits have afforded it.” In another case,
on prosecutorial immunity, a judge suggested not only that the Supreme
Court would take the case but also speculated “that sooner or later the
Supreme Court may follow the views expressed by Judge Kilkenny in his
dissenting opinion,” which he said was “a pretty good petition for
273
certiorari.” In a file memo, another judge said, “I believe that the
Supreme Court will undoubtedly vacate this position, if not now, at some
274
time in the future.” And yet another judge, while agreeing with a panel
dissent in another case, thought it better to wait for a case with the issue
(basing founded suspicion for a car stop on a radio dispatch) “squarely on
point,” but he then added, “If [the case] is as bad as some of us fear it is,
275
maybe the Supreme Court will take a swipe at it during the next term.”
In discouraging the use of en banc hearings, Chief Judge Chambers
espoused the Second Circuit’s view that if a case was important enough
for en banc rehearing, it was important enough for the Supreme Court to
take it, so the court of appeals should let the case go to the Justices
276
without the further delay that en banc rehearing would cause. In one
case, a judge, while not agreeing with the panel, nonetheless voted not to
en banc the case because of “[t]he Chambers-Kaufman view of the
economics of court time,” which he stated as “if a case is as bad as en
reh’g en banc, 590 F.2d 794 (9th Cir. 1979).
269. Memorandum from J. Blaine Anderson to Associates (Dec. 19, 1977), Fannon, 556 F.2d 961,
and Gumerlock, 556 F.2d 1106.
270. Memorandum from Betty B. Fletcher & Dorothy W. Nelson to Associates (Aug. 26, 1992),
Fed. Labor Relations Auth. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, 958 F.2d 1490 (9th Cir. 1992).
271. Memorandum from Cynthia Holcomb Hall (Sept. 10, 1992), Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 958
F.2d 1490.
272. Id.
273. Memorandum from Ben C. Duniway to Associates (Sept. 17, 1974), Imbler v. Pachtman, 500
F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1974), aff’d, 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
274. Memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to file (undated), Imbler, 500 F.2d 1301.
275. Memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to Associates (Nov. 15, 1976), United States v.
Robinson, 536 F.2d 1298 (9th Cir. 1976).
276. Interview with Alfred T. Goodwin in Sisters, Or. (June 22, 2009).
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banc voters think it is, the Supreme Court in its infinite wisdom will
strike it down,” although he recognized “that it may be defective
277
prophecy.” We see more of Chief Judge Chambers’ views in his dissent
from the order granting en banc in a border-search case in which he felt
strongly that en banc rehearing would impede the case’s arrival at the
278
Supreme Court. He again spoke on the matter when he wrote, “I do
think the situation is such that we should get our rulings out promptly so
279
the Supreme Court can take our cases.” To facilitate that, he even
suggested announcing decisions with opinions to follow, a suggestion
with which Judge Herbert Choy agreed “if this will expedite getting the
280
matters to the Supreme Court.” As Chief Judge Chambers was to
remark a bit later, “All I wanted was for panel to take various cases [and]
get them decided and on the way to the Supreme Court,” particularly
where, in his view, “in this Almeida-Sanchez chaff, we have never been
281
anything but a way station.” However, colleagues rejected that specific
282
idea, although some seemed to agree that the Supreme Court would
283
have the last word. Also during consideration of these multiple bordersearch cases, another of the court’s more senior judges suggested that
one panel should make a decision on the effect of the Almeida-Sanchez
case on searches at fixed and temporary checkpoints, with the other

277. Memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to Associates (May 24, 1977), J.R. Simplot Co. v. U.S.
Dist. Ct., Nos. 76-1893, 76-1995, 1976 WL 3826 (9th Cir. Nov. 12, 1976). The “Kaufman” is former
Second Circuit Chief Judge Irving Kaufman.
278. As he stated it,
None of the earmarks of the normal case for en banc are here. It is inescapable that the
Supreme Court will decide the questions here. They are too big and too far reaching for that
Court to ignore them. This en banc hearing results in about a three-months’ delay in the
case getting to the Supreme Court. Meanwhile, two or three district courts are almost
choked with the retroactive question.
Bowen v. United States, 485 F.2d 1388, 1388–89 (9th Cir.) (Chambers, C.J., dissenting from grant of en
banc rehearing), vacated, 413 U.S. 915 (1973), appeal after remand, 500 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1974) (en
banc), aff’d, 422 U.S. 916 (1975). In his inimitable style, he ended, “Taking this case en banc is simply
flying off into the air without a payload.” Id.
279. Memorandum from Richard Chambers to Associates (Jan. 25, 1974), Bowen v. United States,
500 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1974) (en banc), aff’d, 422 U.S. 916 (1975).
280. Memorandum from Herbert Choy to Associates (Jan. 28, 1974), Bowen, 500 F.2d 960.
281. Memorandum from Richard Chambers to Associates (Apr. 9, 1974) (discussing United States
v. Almeida-Sanchez, 452 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1971), rev’d sub nom. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States,
413 U.S. 266 (1973)), Bowen, 500 F.2d 960.
282. See the comment of Judge J. Clifford Wallace, “I do not think it looks well for our court to
have a matter under submission as long as this, and then file an order indicating that an opinion will
follow later, when we could have done so long ago.” Memorandum from J. Clifford Wallace to
Associates (Jan. 30, 1974), Bowen, 500 F.2d 960.
283. See, for example, Judge Goodwin, writing to a judge in another circuit: “I do think the
Supreme Court is going to have to straighten this out.” Letter from Alfred T. Goodwin to Reynoldo
Garza, Judge, S.D. Tex. (June 24, 1974).
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panels to follow that ruling, and if the Supreme Court “doesn’t like our
284
solution it can change it.”
B. Deferring to the Supreme Court
To let cases go to the Supreme Court rather than decide them en
banc may shed work but may also exhibit lower court deference to its
superiors. Another facet of this deference, which allows the lower court
to shepherd its resources, is putting in abeyance cases involving issues the
Justices are considering, including deciding whether to grant review. If
the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in a case from another circuit
with the same or a related issue as the one before the panel, the panel is
likely to wait until the Justices decide the matter. The court of appeals
would stay its hand, let the government seek cert, and “no doubt they
will ultimately be governed by what the Supreme Court does in cases in
285
which it has granted cert.” The en banc coordinator, dealing with a
request for en banc consideration of two sets of cases, said in one case
that there was “a peripheral question,” a wiretap issue, not reached in
the cases at issue but disposed of in yet another case, that “is now before
the Supreme Court,” so it was “probably not necessary for us to proceed
286
further with [that] question until we hear from the Supreme Court.”
During en banc activity, there are disputes as to whether a panel
should file its opinion or wait for a Supreme Court decision. One judge
“raise[d] the question whether we should delay the vote on the en banc
request until the Supreme Court decides McCready [a 4th Circuit case]
or reject the en banc request now, on the theory that should we decide
287
the issue incorrectly the Supreme Court will shortly correct our error,”
and another judge argued that if the Ninth Circuit and Fourth Circuit
cases “are really much the same, . . . [w]e should probably defer the en
banc vote. The Supreme Court, in all likelihood, will decide McCready”
288
shortly. Disagreement about delaying the en banc vote came from a

284. Memorandum from Ben C. Duniway to Associates (Aug. 31, 1973) (regarding United States
v. Almeida-Sanchez, 452 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1971)); see Stephen L. Wasby, Court of Appeals Dynamics
in the Aftermath of a Supreme Court Ruling, 42 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 5 (2011).
285. Memorandum from Ben C. Duniway to Associates & senior judges (Mar. 27, 1973), United
States v. Chavez, 478 F.2d 512 (9th Cir. 1973), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 416 U.S. 562 (1974), and
United States v. King, 478 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1973).
286. Memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to Associates, Talbot Smith, Judge, E.D. Mich., &
James Burns, Judge, D. Or. (Mar. 29, 1973), United States v. Sacco, 491 F.2d 995 (9th Cir. 1974), and
United States v. Smith, 534 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1976) (unpublished table decision).
287. Memorandum from Stephen Reinhardt to active judges (Apr. 14, 1982), Ostrofe v. H.S.
Crocker Co., 670 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated, 460 U.S. 1007 (1983), appeal on remand, 740 F.2d
739 (9th Cir. 1984). The Supreme Court decided Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready two months later.
457 U.S. 465 (1982).
288. Memorandum from J. Blaine Anderson to Associates (Apr. 19, 1982), Ostrofe, 670 F.2d 1378.

Wasby_63-HLJ-747 (Do Not Delete)

March 2012]

3/26/2012 5:28 PM

WHY SIT EN BANC?

797

judge who had earlier pointed out that if (then) Judge Kennedy’s panel
dissent position was adopted by a Seventh Circuit panel that had asked
for a copy of the Ninth Circuit ruling, “the Supreme Court may have an
289
early occasion to review the question” posed in the cases. Yet he said
that the Supreme Court’s decision “is likely to use general language and
broad principles which will not mandate a particular result” in the case
before the Ninth Circuit, although he did add that he had “never
believed that our en banc vote should turn upon whether or not the
Supreme Court is likely to take a particular case,” and he “would
therefore not suggest that any judge vote against en banc on the theory
290
the Supreme Court will correct our error, if error there is.” Then
another judge, pointing out that the present issue “seems to be before
the Supreme Court,” asked, “If so, why should we invest our resources
291
[in an en banc rehearing]?” (The en banc vote failed badly.)
In a situation in which panels were not being consistent in holding
the Board of Immigration Appeals to the Ninth Circuit’s analysis and
one case embodying that analysis had been taken by the Supreme Court,
a suggestion was made that the court’s panels sit back until the Supreme
Court decided the matter. Although a different judge sought en banc to
resolve circuit inconsistency, the requests to await the Supreme Court’s
decision increased, with a judge, seconded by another, suggesting, “We
could not possibly hear this case en banc before the Supreme Court hears
Cardoza-Fonseca” nor decide it before the Supreme Court decided it,
292
and so should not rehear the present case en banc. Another judge
chimed in to say, “By holding the matter in abeyance we obviate the
need for a vote by the entire court on an issue which in all probability
293
will be decided by the Supreme Court.” Given the option as to whether
to en banc the case or hold it for the Supreme Court, all but one judge
voted for the latter, with the one judge believing the Supreme Court
ruling “will not have any bearing on the decision” before the Ninth
294
Circuit. On suggestion by the en banc coordinator that the panel “avoid

289. Memorandum from James R. Browning to Associates (Apr. 13, 1982), Ostrofe, 670 F.2d 1378.
290. Memorandum from James R. Browning to Associates (Apr. 21, 1982), Ostrofe, 670 F.2d 1378.
291. Comment on ballot from J. Clifford Wallace (Apr. 28, 1982) (voting to defer), Ostrofe, 670
F.2d 1378.
292. Memorandum from Mary M. Schroeder to Associates (Aug. 26, 1986), Saenz v. INS, 792 F.3d
144 (9th Cir. 1986) (unpublished table decision); Memorandum from James R. Browning to Associates
(Sept. 9, 1986), Saenz, 792 F.3d 144. The Supreme Court’s decision in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca can be
found at 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
293. Memorandum from Robert Boochever to panel & Associates (Sept. 3, 1986), Saenz, 792 F.3d
144.
294. Memorandum from Jerome Farris to active judges (Sept. 12, 1986), Saenz, 792 F.3d 144.
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295

the necessity of further en banc proceeding,” a view seconded by a
couple of other judges, the panel remanded so as to avoid an en banc vote.
One case illustrates the mixing of the previously discussed claim that
the panel’s ruling conflicts with Supreme Court precedent with deferral
of action until the Supreme Court decides a pending case, followed by
296
renewal of the initial claim. An off-panel judge, who initially stopped
the clock, asserted that the appellant had not presented his claim to the
state courts and thus had not exhausted his state remedies before seeking
297
federal habeas. Although the claim of conflict with the Supreme Court
was not prominent in his memos to the panel, he claimed that not only
was there a conflict with circuit precedent but also that the Supreme
298
Court’s ruling in Duncan v. Henry had not been followed.
The judge and the panel exchanged numerous memoranda over two
months until, in preparing a further response, the author of the panel’s
opinion reported awareness that another Ninth Circuit case raising
roughly the same issue and coming from the same state, Reese v.
299
300
Baldwin, had been granted review by the Supreme Court. The panel
author, stating that “[b]ecause the Supreme Court rarely grants cert on
9th Circuit cases to affirm them,” suggested that the en banc
consideration be deferred until after the Supreme Court’s ruling, adding
that as the defendant was already serving life terms, “[d]elay is of little or
301
no consequence.” Should the Supreme Court hold to the “rigorous and
mechanistic view of procedural default that is being urged by the State
Oregon,” he said, “a lot of judge and lawyer time might [otherwise] be
302
wasted on briefing.” Agreement was reached in late November 2003 to
defer matters.
Three months later, the Supreme Court decided the case, reversing
303
the Ninth Circuit and “holding that a petitioner had not ‘fairly
presented’ his federal claim . . . to a court by mentioning federal
constitutional amendments in his petition” and that “an issue was not
fairly presented to a state supreme court if that court had to read lower

295. Memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to Associates (Mar. 11, 1987), Saenz, 792 F.3d 144.
296. Lounsbury v. Thompson, 340 F.3d 998 (9th Cir. 2003), superseded by 374 F.3d 785 (9th Cir.
2004).
297. Memorandum from Melvin Brunetti to Associates (Sept. 11, 2003), Lounsbury, 340 F.3d 998.
298. Memorandum from Melvin Brunetti to Associates (Sept. 25, 2003) (citing Duncan v. Henry,
513 U.S. 364 (1995)), Lounsbury, 340 F.3d 998.
299. Reese v. Baldwin, 282 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2002), rev’d, 541 U.S. 27 (2004).
300. Baldwin v. Reese, 538 U.S. 1056 (2003) (granting certiorari).
301. Memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to panel & Melvin Brunetti (Nov. 26, 2003),
Lounsbury, 340 F.3d 998.
302. Id.
303. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27 (2004).
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court opinions or papers in order to find the claim.” While the law
clerk to the author of the panel opinion said the new Supreme Court
decision “does not directly conflict” with the present case, it did cause a
problem for the panel’s opinion because it “falls in line with other cases
demanding an explicit statement of a claim in a petition in order to fairly
305
present it to a court.”
Without waiting to hear from the panel, the off-panel judge
returned to the fray, calling for en banc while saying, “I think it is clear
that even the amended opinion goes outside the Supreme Court’s and
our own circuit’s jurisprudence,” to which he added that the ruling “has
explicitly precluded such a loose interpretation of the exhaustion
306
requirement.” The panel then engaged in internal discussion as to how
to proceed. The author at first said about the Supreme Court ruling,
“Now having the benefit of that decision, it appears that a respectable
argument can be made to reject the en banc call’s arguments and
circulate a memo to the full court defending the opinion,” although he
307
conceded that an opposite reading was possible. After a suggestion
from another panel member, the panel, while adhering to its belief that
308
the Supreme Court ruling did affect the result the panel had reached,
asked the en banc caller to withdraw the call so that the original opinion
309
could be withdrawn and a new, amended opinion substituted. With the
off-panel judge not persuaded, the case proceeded to an en banc vote, in
which en banc rehearing failed to achieve a majority of nonrecused
active judges.
In deciding whether to let a case proceed to the Supreme Court
without en banc rehearing, court of appeals judges at times have had to
take into account lawyers’ strategizing about reaching the Supreme
Court. When cases invalidating state laws could still reach the Supreme
Court on appeal, a lawyer might not want the court to reconsider such
rulings en banc. Commenting on the efforts by a state’s new lawyer
(Professor Lawrence Tribe) to withdraw the state’s already-filed PFR
and suggestion for rehearing en banc, a judge said, “The message I get is
that Tribe knows he has a winner and would rather savor his victory in

304. Memorandum from Lika, Law Clerk, to Alfred T. Goodwin (Mar. 2, 2004), Baldwin, 541 U.S.
27.
305. Id.
306. Memorandum from Melvin Brunetti to Associates (Mar. 8, 2004), Lounsbury, 340 F.3d 998.
307. Memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to panel (Mar. 9, 2004), Lounsbury, 340 F.3d 998.
308. “To the contrary, we believe that some of the reasoning in Reese supports our conclusion, and
nothing in the opinion directly addresses the problem in Lounsbury.” Memorandum from panel to
Melvin Brunetti (Mar. 26, 2004), Lounsbury, 340 F.3d 998.
309. Memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to Melvin Brunetti & Associates (Mar. 29, 2004),
Lounsbury, 340 F.3d 998.
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310

the Supreme Court than in the Ninth Circuit.” However, the judge still
wanted en banc rehearing because, if it were granted and the en banc
court upheld the state law, the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction would be
discretionary and the Justices might “let an en banc opinion by our court
stand as the last word on the issue,” as it had with a First Circuit ruling
311
on a Puerto Rico land law. The panel author objected to taking a case
en banc on the basis of speculation about a litigant’s goals and also
312
objected to taking a case en banc to remove a state’s appeal right.
In addition, at least some judges have been willing at times to leave
lawyers to their possible use of certiorari. A judge who argued against
taking en banc the San Francisco schools case (involving Chinesespeaking students in English-only classes) had among his reasons the
availability of the Supreme Court: “The question presented is certainly
novel, the contrary view is well expressed in [the panel] dissenting
opinion, and if the decision is contrary to Supreme Court authority, a
question that I think is at least arguable, the appellants have their
313
remedy via the certiorari route.” (The Supreme Court did grant review
and reversed.) Likewise, in a case on the taking of fingernail scrapings, a
judge concerned about a case originating in his home state of Oregon
said to a fellow Oregon member of the court that one option might be
“to just have the mandate go down and have the Attorney General of
Oregon try to get the Supreme Court to take certiorari and review the
314
case.” He added that might be “the best course to follow” because the
Supreme Court seemed to have “no hesitation whatever in reviewing
315
Ninth Circuit cases,” something that was to become more visible and
quite a matter of controversy in succeeding years.
And in another case, a liberal member of the court declined to join
the panel dissenter and erstwhile liberal colleague Shirley Hufstedler in
supporting en banc because he felt the party that would petition for
certiorari, the FDIC, had “stature” that put it “in a better position than
316
most parties to obtain review.” Another judge, voting the same way,
said the well laid-out positions of the panel author and dissenter would
lead the FDIC “almost surely [to] get” certiorari if it sought it, which it

310. Memorandum from William Norris to Associates (June 1, 1983), Midkiff v. Tom, 702 F.2d 788
(9th Cir. 1983), rev’d sub nom. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
311. Id.
312. Memorandum from Arthur Alarcon to Associates (June 3, 1983), Midkiff, 702 F.2d 788.
313. Memorandum from Ben C. Duniway to Associates & senior judges (Feb. 28, 1973), Lau v.
Nichols, 483 F.2d 791 (1973), rev’d, 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
314. Memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to John Kilkenny, Murphy v. Cupp, 461 F.2d 1006
(9th Cir. 1972), rev’d, 412 U.S. 291 (1973).
315. Id.
316. Vote explanation by Walter Ely (Sept. 28, 1976), Harmsen v. Smith, 542 F.2d 496 (9th Cir.
1976).
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would do if en banc were denied. He added, “This is the kind of
question that ought to be settled by the Supreme Court,” and granting en
banc would mean the case “won’t even be ripe to send to the Supreme
318
Court for another year.” And in the Hawaii land-reform case, in
arguing against en banc hearing, the panel author suggested that a state
court case with the same issues and parties would be taken to the
Supreme Court by those parties and, commenting on his own court’s
slow pace, said, “At the rate we have moved on this matter up to now,
the Hawaiian Supreme Court’s decision may well reach the Supreme
319
Court before our work is done.” However, the Ninth Circuit’s case was
the one the Supreme Court decided.
If letting attorneys for the litigants petition for certiorari is one way
to get cases to the Supreme Court, another way may be statements by the
court of appeals’ own judges. Dissent within a panel can catch the
attention of the Justices or of the clerks in the “cert pool,” but dissent
from denial of rehearing en banc does so even more obviously. When a
judge carries disagreement with a panel ruling to the point of writing a
dissent from the court’s declining to take the case en banc, that writing
can be seen as intended not so much for the judge’s colleagues—as the
judge will have made the same arguments to them in the (unsuccessful)
effort to obtain en banc rehearing—as for external audiences, most
particularly the Supreme Court. The frequent use of such dissents annoys
some other members of the Ninth Circuit, and in one instance, a judge
complained that they “prolong[] argument” and “exacerbate[] divisions,”
because the practice “improperly serves the function of a cert petition, a
320
task better left to counsel.”

Conclusion
This examination of reasons offered by judges for why a court of
appeals should (re)hear cases en banc or should not do so is based
primarily on communications among Ninth Circuit judges preserved in
the case files of Judge Alfred T. Goodwin, the court’s long-time en banc
coordinator. From it, we obtain a richer picture of judges’ within-court
communication. In particular, we see the judges’ reasons for acting in the
period after a three-judge panel has decided a case and as the court
communicates about, and struggles with, taking a case to en banc
rehearing. The reasons offered, while of course differing in their
317. Vote explanation by Ben C. Duniway (Sept. 30, 1976), Harmsen, 542 F.2d 496.
318. Id.
319. Memorandum from Arthur Alarcon to Associates (June 3, 1983), Midkiff v. Tom, 702 F.2d
788 (9th Cir. 1983), rev’d sub nom. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
320. Memorandum from Harry Pregerson to Associates (Jan. 30, 1987), Sw. Marine, Inc. v.
Campbell Indus., 806 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1986), reh’g denied, 811 F.2d 501 (9th Cir. 1987).
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application to particular cases, remain basically the same over the more
than twenty-year period covered here; more recent cases would show the
same types of reasons offered, both for en banc hearing and against it.
We find that judges often use multiple reasons rather than just a single
one in making en banc calls, but the most fundamental, and most
frequently used, reason is that in some way the panel erred and “got it
wrong,” most often in ways specific to the case.
We also see frequent use of the three desiderata stated in FRAP 35.
The first is that there is an intracircuit conflict because the present
opinion runs into or up against prior circuit precedent, which the panel
attempts to distinguish, and at times panels themselves call for en banc
hearing because they see a conflict between a purportedly controlling
case and their view of the law. The second is conflict with rulings of the
Supreme Court or allegations of misapplication of those rulings. And the
third and the most open-ended is that the case is of “extraordinary
importance,” something that can subsume the first two criteria, although
the implication is that something more is necessary. Courts of appeals
often add as another desideratum, one not separately stated in FRAP 35
although indicated there as a matter of importance, intercircuit conflicts,
something many judges try to avoid or at least inveigh against, while
some think each circuit should speak for itself, letting the Supreme Court
resolve any circuit conflicts.
Institutional considerations, particularly that en banc sittings consume
valuable court resources, are yet another part of the mix of reasons to
oppose taking a case en banc, often added to a recitation of the
previously stated reasons. As part of the argument for shepherding
resources for panel rather than en banc work, one finds the particular
view that cases should not be taken en banc if they are going to go to the
Supreme Court in any event, especially if it is likely the Justices will
accept them for review, and that rehearing a case en banc simply extends
the time before a case going to the Supreme Court arrives there. In this
context, we are able to see a little-known aspect of court of appeals
decisionmaking, their deference to the Supreme Court, as the judges
suspend action until the Supreme Court has decided cases that would aid
in disposition of their own caseload, including cases being considered for
en banc rehearing.
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